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Global Diversification and IPO Returns 
 
 
Abstract 
 
A large number of newly listed firms have significant involvement in international 
business activity. In this paper, we examine the effect of international business activity on 
the pricing of initial public offerings (IPOs), post-IPO performance, and survival. In a 
large sample of U.S. IPOs over 1981 to 2012, we find that firms with exports and/or 
foreign sales prior to going public have significantly lower underpricing than firms 
without international business activity. Furthermore, firms with international business 
activity significantly outperform purely domestic IPO firms over three- and five-year 
periods after going public and have a significantly higher survival rate. Overall, we 
provide strong evidence that global diversification has an economically significant effect 
on the valuation and subsequent performance of firms going public. 
 
JEL classification: F23, G24, G32 
Keywords: Initial public offering, Global diversification, IPO underpricing, IPO long-run 
performance, Survival analysis 
 
 
1 
1. Introduction 
 With the increasing importance of market globalization, firms have become more involved in 
international trade and foreign direct investment. By operating in foreign markets, firms may expand 
their revenue base and diversify the risk of domestic cash flow shocks. Global diversification may also 
enhance firm value by helping to ―complete the market‖ in the face of international capital market 
segmentation and/or frictions.
1
 In contrast with this possible value-enhancing perspective, foreign 
operations entail complexities from monitoring and communication, as well as the risks of country 
default, exchange rate fluctuations, and unstable political regimes. The literature generally finds mixed 
support for the influence of international activity on firm performance. A number of studies document 
that firms engaged in export activity have better operating performance than do peer-firms that sell 
domestically only (see, e.g., De Loecker (2007), Greenaway et al. (2007), and Park et al. (2010)). 
Furthermore, Gande et al. (2009) find that global diversification – as measured by foreign sales – 
increases firm value and Reeb et al. (2001) find that global diversification promotes credit ratings and 
decreases the cost of debt. Other studies, however, argue that international business activity (i.e., exports 
and/or foreign sales) decreases firm value. For example, Denis et al. (2002) document that global 
diversification carries an average valuation discount of 18%.
2
 
 To the best of our knowledge, the literature on the costs and benefits of global diversification has 
focused exclusively on large publicly-traded multinational corporations. Although this is clearly an 
obvious and relevant group of companies to study, a large number of small private (i.e., not yet publicly 
traded) companies are actively involved in international business activity. In our sample of 4,994 IPOs 
                                                 
1
 For example, see Errunza and Senbet (1981, 1984), Errunza and Losq (1985, 1989), Merton (1987), and Mauer and Senbet 
(1992). 
2
 From a contingent claims perspective, Doukas and Kan (2006) argue that risk-reducing global diversification should 
increase bondholder value and decrease shareholder value. The upshot is that global diversification may not decrease overall 
firm value. Consistent with their argument, they find that the global diversification discount is increasing with leverage and 
that globally diversified all-equity firms trade at a premium. 
2 
from 1981 to 2012, we find that more than a quarter of the firms going public have exports and/or 
foreign sales in the year of and the year before the initial public offering. For this group of firms, the 
average amount of exports and/or foreign sales to total firm sales is 30% in the year prior to the IPO year. 
In this paper, we contribute to the debate on the costs and benefits of global diversification by focusing 
on the international business activity of private firms in the years immediately surrounding their initial 
public offering. We examine the effect of international business activity on the valuation, long-run 
performance, and survival of newly public firms. 
 A large body of literature documents that IPOs are underpriced as evidenced by an initial offer 
price below the closing price at the end of the first day of trading.
3
 The literature argues that uncertainty 
about the firm’s business, operations, strategy, and ultimately future earnings is an important 
determinant of underpricing because shares must be offered at a discount to compensate investors for 
uncertainty. A key question for this study is whether international business activity influences 
underpricing. On the one hand, if involvement in international markets provides a profit cushion to firms 
and/or diversifies domestic earnings, investors should have lower uncertainty about earnings prospects. 
Thus, the lower uncertainty associated with a globally diversified earnings stream could encourage firms 
and their investment bankers to offer the shares in the IPO at a higher offer price relative to the expected 
secondary market trading price and therefore IPO underpricing would be lower. On the other hand, if 
exports and/or foreign production bring additional risks that offset the benefits of global diversification, 
then we might expect globally diversified firms to face larger underpricing than domestically focused 
firms. We can therefore assess the relative benefits and costs of global diversification by studying 
whether international business activity around the time of the IPO influences IPO underpricing. 
                                                 
3
 See Ritter and Welch (2002), Ljungqvist (2007), and Ritter (2011) for reviews of this literature. 
3 
 In addition to being underpriced on average, it is well documented that IPO firms underperform 
the market and matching firms after going public (see, e.g., Ritter (1991) and Loughran and Ritter 
(1995)).
4
 Consistent with this long-run underperformance, a number of studies also document a low 
survival rate of newly listed firms (see, e.g., Jain and Kini (2000, 2008) and Fama and French (2004)). If 
global diversification has persistent benefits to firms going public, then we might expect less post-issue 
underperformance and a higher survival rate of newly listed firms with international business activity. 
Of course, if international business activity brings additional shocks to earnings that cannot be mitigated 
through diversification and/or hedging, then we would expect worse underperformance and survival of 
IPO firms with exports and/or foreign sales. 
 In this paper, we investigate the impact of global diversification on the underpricing and post-
issue performance of firms going public. As noted above, 1,384 or 27.7% of our sample IPO firms have 
exports and/or foreign sales in the year of the IPO and the year before. Relative to domestically focused 
IPO firms, globally diversified IPO firms tend to have higher productivity, higher investment (capital 
expenditures and R&D), and greater age at the time they go public. Interestingly, however, they are not 
always larger. While the average and median IPO firms with foreign operations tend to be roughly 
double the size of their purely domestic counterparts – as measured by market capitalization, assets, or 
sales – the average and median exporting IPO firms are significantly smaller. 
 Controlling for IPO and firm characteristics known to influence underpricing as well as time and 
industry fixed effects, we find that global diversification significantly decreases underpricing. 
Depending on whether the IPO firm is an exporter and/or has foreign sales, estimates from multivariate 
regressions show that underpricing is 2-6% lower for globally diversified IPOs in comparison to 
domestically-focused IPOs. Furthermore, IPO underpricing is significantly decreasing in the intensity of 
                                                 
4
 Recent studies argue that long-run underperformance exits only among certain types of IPOs. For example, Brau et al. 
(2012) find only newly listed firms that acquire within a year after their IPO underperform and Ritter (2011) finds that IPO 
long-run underperformance is present only in small firms. 
4 
international business. For example, a one standard deviation increase in the ratio of exports and/or 
foreign sales to total firm sales decreases underpricing by approximately one percent. These results are 
robust when we account for the potential influences of endogeneity and selection bias on the relation 
between underpricing and international business activity. Overall, our analysis strongly supports the 
notion that global diversification reduces IPO uncertainty and thereby decreases underpricing. 
 We next compute calendar time abnormal returns and buy-and-hold returns to examine the long-
run performance of globally diversified newly-public firms. We find that IPO firms with exports and/or 
foreign sales significantly outperform IPOs without international business activity over three and five 
year periods after the IPO. These results are robust when we use a purged eight-factor model to explain 
post-IPO returns,
5
 when we group IPOs into size-based portfolios, when we group IPOs by post-issue 
acquisition activity, and when we control for selection bias using propensity score matching. 
Lastly, we investigate whether global diversification affects the survival of IPO firms. 
Specifically, we test whether newly-public firms with international business activity have a lower 
probability of failure (i.e., being delisted because of bankruptcy or liquidation). Using a hazard model to 
estimate the influence of IPO and firm characteristics on survival, we find that globally diversified IPO 
firms have a lower hazard rate (i.e., higher survival rate) than domestic IPO firms. Overall, the evidence 
from the long-run performance and survival analysis strongly suggests that global diversification 
mitigates long-run underperformance and enhances long-run survival. 
This paper makes four contributions to the literature. First, quite a few firms are actively 
involved in international business prior to going public. However, global diversification has not been 
explored as a factor contributing to IPO pricing and subsequent performance. Our paper is the first to 
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 The eight factors include the three Fama-French (1993) factors, the Carhart (1997) momentum factor, the Cooper et al. 
(2008) asset growth factor, the Harvey and Siddique (2000) co-skewness factor, the Lyandres et al. (2008) investment factor, 
and the Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) liquidity factor. Following Loughran and Ritter (2000), we construct the factors after 
purging firms that have publicly issued equity in an IPO or SEO during the prior five years. 
5 
document that global diversification is an economically significant determinant of IPO initial returns, 
long-run performance, and survival of newly public firms. Second, by studying IPO initial and long-run 
returns, we bring a valuation dimension to the impact of international business activity on firm 
performance. By comparison, the international economics literature assesses the impact of international 
business activity on firm performance with non-stock-market based measures of performance (e.g., 
productivity, capital intensity, and liquidity ratios).
6
 Third, to the best our knowledge, empirical studies 
of global diversification focus on large, publicly-traded firms. None have focused on small firms despite 
their non-trivial involvement in international markets. Since firm size tends to be small at the IPO stage, 
our study contributes to the literature on global diversification by documenting the value implications of 
global diversification for a sample of small firms as they transition from being privately-held to 
publicly-traded. Lastly, our results have important strategic and investment implications for firms and 
investors. Specifically, firms going public that have international business activity have significantly 
lower underpricing and better risk-adjusted long-run returns than firms with purely domestic operations. 
We find that a strategy of shorting a portfolio of newly public firms with purely domestic operations and 
investing in a portfolio of newly public firms with international business activity generates positive risk-
adjusted returns of about 50-60 basis points per month before transaction costs. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief discussion of our 
hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 presents our empirical results and Section 5 
concludes. 
 
2. Background and hypothesis development 
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 A recent exception is Breinlich (2014), who assesses the effect of trade liberalization on firms by examining stock market 
reactions to the loosening of trade restrictions. 
6 
 This section draws on the literature in finance and international economics to develop testable 
hypotheses for the effect of global diversification on IPO underpricing, long-run performance, and 
survival. 
 
2.1. Global diversification and IPO underpricing 
 A persistent puzzle about IPOs is that they are underpriced on average or have positive initial 
returns computed from the offer price to the closing price at the end of the first day of trading. For 
example, over the period from 1980 to 2014, underpricing of U.S. IPOs averaged 18%.
7
 This suggests 
that on average the offer price is too low and that firms are leaving money on the table. Although a 
number of explanations have been advanced in the literature for why IPOs are underpriced, at its core 
the primary driver seems to be lack of information and/or uncertainty about the business and earnings 
potential of the firm going public. This is especially true for high technology firms where either the 
technology is so new that it is not ―spanned‖ by existing technologies of publicly traded firms or there is 
a high degree of uncertainty associated with the future profitability of all firms with that type of 
technology. A key implication of this explanation is that underpricing is increasing in the degree of 
uncertainty (see, e.g., Ritter (1984)).
8
 
 If engaging in international business helps expand and stabilize a firm’s revenue base and 
generally contributes to greater awareness about a firm going public, then we would expect a decrease in 
uncertainty about the pricing of the IPO. Based on the arguments advanced in the IPO literature, we 
would therefore expect that a globally diversified firm is more fully priced when it is brought public 
resulting in lower underpricing. From a similar although different perspective, to the extent that global 
diversification enhances the spanning of the firm’s technology in the secondary market (i.e., where the 
                                                 
7
 For data on underpricing, see Jay Ritter’s website (http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ipodata.htm). 
8
 See Ritter and Welch (2002), Ljungvist (2007), and Ritter (2011) for reviews of explanations for underpricing of IPOs. The 
spanning argument is formally advanced in Mauer and Senbet (1992). Merton (1987) has a similar explanation to the 
spanning argument based on market segmentation caused by lack of investor awareness. 
7 
firm trades once it goes public) or helps complete the market by providing investors access to otherwise 
segmented markets, we would also expect a decrease in underpricing. We recognize, however, that the 
additional risks associated with exports and/or foreign sales (e.g., exchange rate fluctuations) and 
possibly the complexity of managing operations both domestically and abroad might lead to a discount 
placed on globally diversified IPOs. Thus, although we predict that globally diversified IPOs will have 
lower underpricing than domestically focused IPOs, it is ultimately an empirical question. 
 
2.2. Global diversification and IPO long-run performance 
 Another empirical result widely documented in the IPO literature is that newly public firms 
underperform in the years immediately after the IPO. This long-run underperformance is documented by, 
for example, Ritter (1991), Loughran and Ritter (1995), and Fama and French (2004). Given that the 
fundamental value of a firm is its discounted expected future cash flows, global diversification can 
enhance long-run performance and hence firm value in at least two ways. First, involvement in 
international business provides an additional revenue channel that may enhance and/or diversify a firm’s 
domestic revenue stream.
9
 Second, global diversification may provide a natural hedge of domestic 
systematic risk (e.g., an economic downturn) that may decrease a firm’s discount rate. Consistent with 
the notion that global diversification is beneficial, recent studies by Santos et al. (2008) and Gande et al. 
(2009) document that global diversification enhances publicly-traded firms’ values.10 Building on these 
arguments, we hypothesize that globally diversified IPOs have better long-run performance than 
domestically focused IPOs. Similar to the prediction on underpricing, however, we recognize that the 
additional risks inherent in international business activity might offset the long-run benefits of global 
                                                 
9
 See, for example, Melitz (2003) for a dynamic industry model where only the most productive firms export, which leads to 
a positive feedback effect on a globally diversified firm’s profitability. 
10
 This contrasts with the well documented empirical finding that domestic diversification leads to a discount in firm value. 
See, for example, the papers by Lang and Stulz (1994), Berger and Ofek (1995), Comment and Jarrell (1995), Servaes (1996), 
and Lins and Servaes (1999). A number of papers question this finding, however, including Whited (2001), Campa and Kedia 
(2002), Billett and Mauer (2000, 2003), and Villalonga (2004). 
8 
diversification. Indeed, Denis et al. (2002) argue that global diversification increases coordination and 
organizational costs, and may engender inefficiencies associated with building a global empire. Thus, 
like underpricing, it is ultimately an empirical question whether global diversification has a positive 
effect on long-run performance. 
 
2.3. Global diversification and the survival of IPO firms 
 Jain and Kini (1994) find a significant decline in operating performance for the median IPO firm 
over the three-year period after the IPO. This result and the well documented poor stock market 
performance over a similar period after the IPO may help explain the low survival rate of newly public 
firms (see, e.g., Fama and French (2004) and Jain and Kini (2000, 2008)). Studies have shown, however, 
that firms engaged in international business activity are more financially stable and have higher 
productivity rates than firms focused purely on domestic business (see, e.g., De Loecker (2007), 
Greenaway et al. (2007), and Greenaway et al. (2008)). In effect, global business operations provide a 
cushion to negative domestic economic shocks. Focusing on the experience of newly-public firms, it 
therefore seems reasonable to postulate that the survival rate of globally diversified IPO firms is higher 
than that of IPO firms with domestic operations only. Nevertheless, there are additional costs and risks 
associated with international business that may negatively affect IPO firm survival. For example, Melitz 
(2003) and Tybout (2003) note that globally diversified firms face a variety of additional costs 
associated with entering and operating in foreign markets that may impair a firm’s ability to deal with 
economic shocks. Moreover, Greenaway et al. (2008) argue that global firms face more competitors and 
Baldwin and Yan (2011) argue that global firms are increasingly subject to tariff and exchange rate 
shocks. For these reasons, it is unclear whether global diversification helps or hurts the survival of newly 
public firms. 
 
9 
3. Sample and data 
We construct our IPO sample from the Securities Data Corporation (SDC) New Issues database. 
We obtain initially 12,636 U.S. IPOs between 1981 and 2012. Merging with CRSP leaves 11,454 IPOs. 
We then apply the following screens: 
1. delete 2,618 IPOs in the financial industry with SIC codes 6000-6999 and 119 IPOs in regulated 
industries with SIC codes 4900-4999; 
2. delete 589 IPOs with an offer price less than $5; 
3. delete 935 REITS, limited partnerships, closed-end funds, ADRs, and unit IPOs; and 
4. delete 671 spinoffs and carve-outs.11 
Applying these screens to the sample of 11,454 IPOs produces a sample of 6,522 IPOs. Since we need 
accounting data to compute many of the variables used in the study, we require that IPO firms are in the 
Compustat database. We implement this criterion by matching the sample of 6,522 IPOs to the 
CRSP/Compustat Merged database and obtain a sample of 5,759 IPOs. Lastly, to ensure a common 
sample of IPOs throughout most of the analysis, we require that IPOs have non-missing data to compute 
the baseline variables in our underpricing regressions (see Table 4 and the variable definitions in the 
Appendix). This results in a final sample of 4,994 IPOs over the period from 1981 to 2012. 
Following the global diversification literature (e.g., Denis et al. (2002)), we focus on exports and 
foreign sales. Thus, for each IPO firm in the sample, we gather data on whether the firm has exports 
and/or foreign sales in the year of the IPO and the year before the IPO. The distinction between exports 
and foreign sales is that exports are the sale of domestically manufactured products in foreign countries 
and/or markets, whereas foreign sales result from the sale of products manufactured in a foreign country. 
Foreign manufactured products may be sold in the U.S. (i.e., domestically), in the foreign country where 
                                                 
11
 The screens in 1, 2, and 3 are standard in the IPO literature (see, e.g., Butler et al. (2014)). The screen in 4 ensures that our 
sample does not include spinoffs and carve-outs of publicly-traded firms with global operations. 
10 
they are produced, or in another country.
12
 We obtain information on export activity from the Compustat 
Geographic Segment database. An IPO firm is designated as an Exporter if at least one business 
segment reports export sales (variable name SALEXG) in the year prior to the IPO and in the IPO year. 
We obtain information on foreign sales from the Compustat Industrial Fundamental database. An IPO 
firm is designated as having Foreign sales if it has pre-tax foreign income (variable name PIFO) in the 
year prior to the IPO and in the IPO year.
13
 
Table 1 reports the distribution of IPOs by year (Panel A) and by industry (Panel B). The table 
reports four groups of globally diversified IPOs: IPOs with exports, IPOs with foreign sales, IPOs with 
exports and/or foreign sales, and IPOs with exports and foreign sales.
14
 To gauge the intensity of 
international business activity, the three far right-hand columns of Table 1 report ratios of export sales to 
total firm sales, foreign sales to total firm sales, and export sales and/or foreign sales to total firm sales 
by year (Panel A) and by industry (Panel B). All sales figures are from the fiscal year-end prior to the 
IPO year.
15
 
As seen in Panel A, about 28% of the sample has exports and/or foreign sales. For this group of 
IPO firms, exports and/or foreign sales are on average 30% of total firm sales. It is interesting to note 
that the number of IPO firms with both exports and foreign sales is small, which suggests that globally 
diversified IPO firms tend to focus on exporting domestically produced goods or producing goods 
abroad and selling them internationally (including back in the U.S.). Also note that exporting is a larger 
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 An appendix is available on request that provides examples of sample firm IPO prospectuses (SEC S-1 Forms) reporting 
international business activity and the potential risks and benefits arising therefrom. 
13
 Foreign sales information can also be obtained from the Compustat Geographic Segment database by identifying non-
domestic segments. We are cautioned by Compustat, however, that reporting of segment foreign sales is sporadic. Instead, 
Compustat recommends that researchers focus on firm-wide pre-tax foreign income to determine whether a firm has foreign 
business operations. 
14
 Note that the group of exporters includes IPO firms with foreign sales if the firm has both exports and foreign sales. 
Similarly, the group of foreign sellers includes IPO firms with exports if the firm has both foreign sales and exports. 
15
 We compute foreign sales as the sum of the sales of non-domestic segments reported in the Compustat Geographic 
Segment database. As noted in footnote 13, the sum underestimates total foreign sales. 
11 
share of international business activity in the 1980s and 1990s, whereas foreign operations predominate 
in the 2000s. 
Panel B reports the sample distribution by Fama-French industry categories. Observe that IPOs 
with international business activity are fairly evenly distributed across industries. Note also that when 
the sample is separated into high technology and non-high technology industries, a larger number of 
globally diversified IPO firms are in high technology industries. 
Panel A of Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for the sample. In addition to the global 
diversification variables, the table reports descriptive statistics for IPO initial return (Underpricing), the 
Butler et al. (2014) robust controls for underpricing regressions, other IPO and firm characteristics, and 
a list of variables that we use as instruments for the global diversification variables. Definitions for all of 
these variables in the order in which they appear in Table 2 are provided in the Appendix. 
As discussed above, note that a significant fraction of sample IPO firms report exports and/or 
foreign sales (27.7%) and for these firms the mean and median fractions of firm sales generated from 
international business activity are 30% and 24%, respectively. Looking at IPO sample characteristics, 
mean (median) underpricing is 20% (8%) and IPO proceeds are $57 ($32) million. The proportions of 
sample IPO firms backed by a venture capital firm and offered through a prestigious underwriter are 44% 
and 51%, respectively. Lastly, among the many other IPO and firm characteristics reported in the table, 
note that the mean (median) age of the firm at the time of going public is 15 (8) years. 
Panel B of Table 2 reports correlations between IPO underpricing, international business activity 
variables, and the instruments for the international business activity variables.
16
 The first four 
international business activity variables are indicator variables that are equal to one, respectively, when 
the IPO firm is an exporter (Exporter), has foreign sales (Foreign sales), has exports and/or foreign sales 
(Exp and/or fgn sales), or has both exports and foreign sales (Exp and fgn sales). The remaining 
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 A table with the correlations between all of the variables reported in Panel A of Table 2 is available upon request. 
12 
variables measure the intensity of international business. They include exports to total firm sales 
(Exports/sales), foreign sales to total firm sales (Foreign/sales), and exports and/or foreign sales to total 
firm sales (Exp and/or fgn/sales). Consistent with the notion that global diversification has a positive 
effect on firm value, we see that IPO underpricing is significantly negatively correlated with all of the 
international business activity variables. Of course, we need to control for other determinants of 
underpricing before we can conclude that global diversification has a separate influence on the 
performance of IPOs.
17
 
 
4. Results 
4.1. Univariate comparisons of IPOs with and without international business activity 
 We first make a comparison of the IPO and firm characteristics of globally diversified IPOs with 
purely domestic IPOs. Table 3 reports mean and median comparisons between IPOs with exports and/or 
foreign sales and IPOs without international business activity. We see that globally diversified IPOs 
have lower mean underpricing than purely domestic IPOs (16% versus 21%) but identical median 
underpricing (8%). Comparing other characteristics, observe that globally diversified IPOs are older and 
more likely to have venture capital support, be brought public by a prestigious underwriter, and be in a 
high-technology industry than purely domestic IPOs. Globally diversified IPOs, however, are not 
necessarily larger. In particular, in unreported results the group of exporter IPOs is significantly smaller 
than purely domestic IPOs.
18
 Lastly, note that globally diversified IPOs are more likely to receive 
analyst coverage – and by a larger number of analysts – within a year of going public and are less (more) 
likely to be brought public during hot (cold) IPO markets than purely domestic IPOs. 
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 We discuss the correlations between underpricing, the international business activity variables, and the instruments for the 
international business activity variables in Section 4. 
18
 The results on separate comparisons of exporter IPOs versus domestic IPOs and foreign seller IPOs versus domestic IPOs 
are available upon request. 
13 
 
4.2. Multivariate tests of the influence of global diversification on IPO underpricing 
We hypothesize that global diversification decreases underpricing by reducing value uncertainty 
which allows the firm and its investment bank to more fully price the IPO to investors in the market. We 
also note that international business activity may allow for enhanced spanning of the IPO in the market 
or help complete the market, which should also decrease underpricing. Given the additional risks of 
international business activity, however, we recognize that globally diversified IPO firms may actually 
trade at a discount relative to purely domestic IPO firms and that therefore underpricing may be larger 
for such firms. 
Table 4 reports regressions of IPO initial returns (i.e., underpricing) on international business 
activity variables and a set of control variables documented in the literature as robust determinants of 
underpricing. As defined above, the international business activity variables are specified as dummy 
variables. Models (1) and (2) use the variable Exporter, Models (3) and (4) use the variable Foreign 
sales, Model (5) uses the variable Exporter and/or foreign sales, and Model (6) uses the variable 
Exporter and foreign sales. Models (1), (3), and (5) use the full sample. Model (2) excludes IPOs with 
foreign sales that do not have exports (i.e., the coefficient on the dummy variable Exporter measures the 
difference in underpricing between IPOs with exports and IPOs without any international business 
activity). Model (4) excludes IPOs with exports that do not have foreign sales (i.e., the coefficient on the 
dummy variable Foreign sales measures the difference in underpricing between IPOs with foreign sales 
and IPOs without any international business activity). Model (6) excludes IPOs that have either exports 
or foreign sales (i.e., the coefficient on the dummy variable Exporter and foreign sales measures the 
difference in underpricing between IPOs with exports and foreign sales and IPOs without any 
international business activity). 
14 
Among control variables, the regressions include the 15 variables in Table 4 of Butler et al. 
(2014) which they document are robust determinants of underpricing, except that we replace their 
―News stories‖ variable with ―Number of analysts‖. Both variables are used in the literature – Cook et al. 
(2006) and Cliff and Denis (2004), respectively – to proxy for investment bank effort to promote an IPO. 
We use the I/B/E/S database for analyst information and we follow Chang et al. (2006) to define the 
―Number of analysts‖ as the maximum number of analysts who make annual earnings forecasts in any 
month within one year after the IPO issue date.
19
 In addition, we use the Helwege and Liang (2004) 
market heat measure to construct hot and cold market dummy variables (see the Appendix for variable 
descriptions). Lastly, the regressions include the IPO offer price and year and Fama-French 48 industry 
fixed effects. We report t-statistics in parentheses below parameter estimates that are computed using 
robust standard errors clustered by industry.
20
 
As seen in the table, the coefficients on the international business activity variables are all 
significantly negative. The coefficient estimates also appear to be economically significant. Thus, after 
controlling for known determinants of IPO initial returns, we see that IPO firms with exports have 3.1% 
lower underpricing than purely domestic IPO firms (Model (2)), IPO firms with foreign sales have 4.3% 
lower underpricing than purely domestic IPO firms (Model (4)), IPO firms with exports and/or foreign 
sales have 3.1% lower underpricing than purely domestic IPO firms (Model (5)), and IPO firms with 
both exports and foreign sales have 5.7% lower underpricing than purely domestic IPO firms (Model 
(6)). Overall, the effect of global diversification on IPO initial returns is consistent with the prediction 
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 We assume that firms not covered by I/B/E/S have no analyst coverage. Our results are robust to using the variable 
―Analyst coverage‖, which is a dummy variable equal to one if there is at least one analyst providing an earnings forecast for 
the IPO firm within one year after the IPO issue date. 
20
 Our results are robust if instead we cluster standard errors by year or by industry and year (i.e., two-way clustering). We do 
not report t-statistics based on two-way clustering, however, because it places additional restrictions on the errors that may be 
unrealistic. In particular, clustering at the industry-year level assumes that for a given industry, IPO firms’ errors are 
uncorrelated over time. In purely cross-sectional databases such as ours, it is generally recommended to use one-way 
clustering with fixed effects to absorb common shocks (see, e.g., Baum et al. (2011) and Cameron and Miller (2015)). 
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that global diversification reduces valuation uncertainty and/or enhances spanning/completeness, 
thereby allowing the firm and its investment banker to more fully price the offering. 
The signs of the coefficients on the control variables in the regressions are consistent with the 
results reported in the literature. In particular, note that the Butler et al. (2014) 15 robust control 
variables in Table 4 – Log firm sales through Prior 30 day Nasdaq return – have the same signs (and in 
general significance levels) as reported in Table 4 of Butler et al. (2014). Also note that although Offer 
price has a significantly positive coefficient, the hot and cold market variables are not significantly 
different from zero.
21
 
 Table 5 reports regressions that examine the differential effect of exporter versus foreign seller 
on underpricing and the impact of multiple foreign regions on underpricing. To isolate the differential 
effect of exporter versus foreign seller on underpricing, Models (1) and (2) include the dummy variable 
exporter and are estimated using only global IPOs with exports and/or foreign sales (Model (1)) or 
global IPOs with exports or foreign sales (Model (2)). As seen in the table, the coefficients on exporter 
are not significantly different from zero which suggests that exports and foreign sales are equally 
effective in reducing IPO underpricing. 
 Models (3) and (4) in Table 5 examine the effect on IPO underpricing of having foreign sales in 
multiple geographic locations.
22
 We define the dummy variable multiple regions equal to one if an IPO 
with foreign sales has operations in more than one region of the world. Model (3) includes Foreign sales 
and the interaction between Foreign sales and multiple regions and is estimated using the full sample of 
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 Including the offer price in the regression has no impact on any of the other coefficients in the regression. Booth and Chua 
(1996) and Fernando et al. (2004) develop liquidity-based arguments for why offer price should be related to initial return 
and also find a positive relation between IPO initial return and offer price. 
22
 The Compustat Geographic Segment database does not provide information on the location of exports and the data for the 
location of foreign operations is missing for most of the sample and relatively coarse when reported (i.e., at the region level 
and not the country level). Thus, in our IPO sample, we have no location information for the 893 IPOs with exports and we 
have regional location information for only 181 of the 648 IPOs with foreign sales. The regions include Asia-Pacific, Europe, 
North America, South America, and Africa/Middle East. We find that 74 of the IPOs with foreign sales have foreign 
operations in more than one region. 
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global and domestic IPOs, and Model (4) includes the interaction of Foreign sales and multiple regions 
and is estimated using only global IPOs with foreign sales. As seen in the table, the coefficients on the 
interaction variables in both Models (3) and (4) are significantly negative which suggests that the 
decrease in underpricing when the IPO firm has foreign sales is larger when it has operations in more 
than one region. 
Table 6 reports regressions that estimate the effect of international business intensity on IPO 
initial returns. In these regressions, we examine whether the proportion of total firm sales derived from 
exports (Exports/sales), foreign sales (Foreign/sales), and exports and/or foreign sales (Exp and/or 
fgn/sales) in the year prior to the IPO influences IPO initial returns. Models (1), (3) and (5) add these 
intensity variables to the baseline underpricing regression, while Models (2), (4), and (6) also include the 
squares of the respective international business intensity variables to check for nonlinearity in the 
relation between underpricing and intensity. Panel A reports regressions that use the full sample of 
global and domestic IPOs and sets the international business intensity variables equal to zero for purely 
domestic IPO firms. Panel B reports regressions using the subsample of global IPO firms (i.e., only IPO 
firms with exports and/or foreign operations). The control variables in the regressions are the same as 
those used in Table 4 and are defined in the Appendix. All regressions include year and Fama-French 
48-industry fixed effects. We report t-statistics in parentheses below parameter estimates that are 
computed using robust standard errors clustered by industry. 
As seen in the table, there is generally a strong negative relation between underpricing and 
international business intensity in both Panel A and Panel B regressions. We do not, however, find 
evidence of a nonlinear relation, since the coefficients on the squared international business intensity 
variables are not significantly different from zero in either Panel A or Panel B. The relation between 
underpricing and intensity also appears to be economically significant. Using the coefficient estimates in 
17 
Model (5), a one standard deviation increase in Exp and/or fgn/sales decreases underpricing by 1.024 
percentage points for the full sample of global and domestic IPOs in Panel A and by 0.697 percentage 
points for the subsample of global IPOs in Panel B.
23
 
A potential concern with the regression analysis is that our international business activity 
variables are endogenous which would render the underpricing regression results biased and potentially 
misleading. To correct for endogeneity in the Table 4 specifications, we use a two stage least squares 
procedure suggested by Wooldridge (2002) with a probit model to predict the probability of 
international business in the first-stage regression.
24
 Thus we first estimate a probit regression for the 
likelihood of international business using as regressors all of the variables in the regressions of Table 4 
(excluding the international business indicator variables) along with two instrumental variables. 
Following the international economics literature (see, e.g., Melitz (2003), De Loecker (2007) and di 
Giovanni and Levchenko (2009)), we use productivity and trade openness as instrumental variables for 
international business activity. Melitz (2003) and De Loecker (2007) establish that productivity is an 
important predictor of firms’ global market involvement. Following standard practice, we define 
productivity as the natural logarithm of one plus average industry productivity, where productivity is net 
sales in millions of 2009 constant dollars divided by the number of employees in thousands and industry 
is based on four-digit SIC code. Industry trade openness is a proxy for the likelihood of international 
business (because of comparative advantage in technology or endowments, or increasing returns to scale) 
for an average firm in the industry; it is also a good proxy for frictions associated with international 
business such as transportation costs, tariffs, political uncertainty, and cultural barriers (see, e.g., di 
Giovanni and Levchenko (2009)). Again, following the international economics literature we define 
trade openness as either the proportion of sales derived from international business or the fraction of 
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 The computations are coefficient 5.920 × std. dev. 0.173 = 1.024 and coefficient 3.113 × std. dev. 0.224 = 0.697. 
24
 For the international business intensity variables, we use a Heckman selection model to control for endogeneity and 
potential selection bias. The results are robust and available upon request. 
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firms engaged in international business in an IPO firm’s four-digit SIC code in the year that it goes 
public. While industry productivity and trade openness are highly correlated with firm-level exports and 
foreign sales, there is little reason to believe that they have a direct influence on the underpricing of a 
specific firm in the industry, other than through their association with firm-level exports and foreign 
sales. Indeed, as seen in Panel B of Table 2, while the correlations between productivity and trade 
openness and the business activity variables are large and significantly positive, the correlations between 
productivity and trade openness and underpricing are negative but quite small. 
Table 7 reports second stage underpricing regressions using fitted probabilities for exporter, 
foreign sales, exporter and/or foreign sales, and exporter and foreign sales from first stage probit 
models.
25
 Panel A reports results for the cases where the fitted probabilities are from probits using 
industry trade openness based on proportion of sales from international business and Panel B reports 
results for cases where the fitted probabilities are from probits using industry trade openness based on 
fraction of firms engaged in international business.
26
 The results in Table 7 confirm the regression 
results in Table 4. There is a negative relation between IPO underpricing and the fitted probabilities of 
engaging in international business. In Panel A, for example, a one standard deviation increase in the 
fitted probability of being an exporter and/or foreign seller decreases underpricing by 4.74%, which is 
the same order of magnitude of the result using indicator variables in Table 4. 
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 The first stage probit models are available upon request. 
26
 We use the Cragg-Donald statistic to assess whether the instruments are weak. When there is one endogenous regressor as 
in our 2SLS models, this statistic has an F distribution under the null hypothesis that the instruments have no explanatory 
power in the first stage regression. With one endogenous regressor and two excluded instruments, the critical value (Stock-
Yogo weak ID test) for the Cragg-Donald statistic for 10% maximal size distortion is 19.93. As can be seen in Table 7, all 
regressions easily exceed this critical value and reject the null hypothesis of weak instruments. Since we have two 
instruments and one endogenous regressor, we use the Sargan test for overidentifying restrictions to assess whether the 
instruments are uncorrelated with the second-stage error. If the test statistic – which is distributed chi-square – exceeds the 
critical value we reject the null hypotheses that the instruments are uncorrelated with the structural error and conclude that at 
least one of the instruments is not exogenous. As can be seen in Table 7, none of the p-values warrants rejection of the null 
hypothesis. 
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While our results strongly support the hypothesis that international business activity mitigates 
underpricing, it is still possible that the effects we observe are at least partially attributable to selection 
bias. Specifically, international business activity may proxy for (possibly unobservable) firm 
characteristics and firms with these characteristics self-select into foreign markets and experience lower 
underpricing when they subsequently go public. We mitigate selection bias using propensity score 
matching (PSM).
27
 The goal of PSM is to statistically replicate the undoable test of ―treating‖ an 
observation (e.g., a firm going public) with an effect (e.g., international business activity) and comparing 
the outcome for the treated observation to what it would be if the same observation were untreated. PSM 
attempts to replicate this test by matching treated and untreated observations (i.e., two different 
observations) using a propensity score model that is based on a number of covariates and then 
comparing the outcome of interest (e.g., IPO initial returns) for the treatment and control samples. 
Presumably, the confounding characteristics – even the ones that are unobservable – are ―balanced‖ (i.e., 
the same) in the treatment and control samples and therefore the difference in outcomes between the two 
samples is an unbiased estimate of the treatment effect. 
Table 8 uses PSM to match IPO firms with international business activity (treatment sample) to 
those without international business activity (control sample). Panel A reports the estimated probit 
models used to compute propensity scores (i.e., probability of international business activity) to match 
treatment and control firms. We estimate four models: Model (1) predicts exporter, Model (2) predicts 
foreign seller, Model (3) predicts exporter and/or foreign seller, and Model (4) predicts exporter and 
foreign seller. Following the international economics literature on the determinants of a firm being an 
exporter (e.g., De Loecker (2007) and Eaton et al. (2011)) or engaging in foreign direct investment (e.g., 
Helpman et al. (2004)), the probit models include a measure of productivity. The models also include as 
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 Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) were the first to suggest this technique to mitigate problems of causality and selection bias. 
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covariates sales, capital expenditures, firm age, leverage, research and development, number of analysts, 
a prestigious underwriter dummy, a recession dummy, and industry fixed effects.
28
 
We use the probit models to compute a propensity score for each IPO firm in the sample. Based 
on the propensity scores for the treated IPOs (i.e., those with international business activity) and 
candidate control IPOs (i.e., those without international business activity), we use nearest-neighbor (NN) 
matching with replacement to implement one-to-one and one-to-three matching of treatment and control 
samples (see e.g., Abadie et al. (2004)).
29
 We allow for replacement because a control IPO can be a best 
match for more than one treatment IPO. This process produces 8 treatment and control samples (i.e., 4 
treatment and control samples based on Models (1)-(4) using one-to-one propensity score NN matching 
and 4 treatment and control samples based on Models (1)-(4) using one-to-three propensity score NN 
matching). 
Panel B reports a balance test for Model (1) in Panel A where we compare the means of the 
covariates for the treatment group to those of the one-to-one NN matched control group. This goodness 
of fit test assesses whether the means of the covariates in the propensity score model are statistically 
indistinguishable in treatment and control groups. As seen in the panel, the balance test is easily passed. 
Although unreported in Panel B, all treatment and control samples pass the balance test. 
Panel C reports average underpricing for treatment and control groups based on one-to-one and 
one-to-three propensity score matching. The panel also reports z-statistics for the difference in average 
underpricing that are computed using the method in Abadie and Imbens (2006).
30
 As seen in the panel, 
the treatment samples have significantly lower underpricing than the corresponding control samples and 
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 All variables are defined in the Appendix and are measured in the IPO year. Results are robust if we lag the variables but 
the sample size is substantially reduced because of incomplete Compustat information in firm-years prior to the IPO year. 
29
 Our results are robust to one-to-k matching where k = 1, 2,…5. We report results for one-to-three matching because there 
is roughly one IPO with international business activity for every three IPOs without international business activity in the 
sample. 
30
 Abadie and Imbens (2008) argue that bootstrapping methods should not be used for inference with matching estimators. 
We follow their prescription and compute a z-statistic using the analytical estimator of the asymptotic variance of matching 
estimators proposed by Abadie and Imbens (2006). 
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the z-statistics for the differences in average underpricing are all statistically significant at reasonable 
confidence levels. The large differences in average underpricing between treatment and control samples 
– ranging from 7.7% to 12% – strongly suggest that international business activity reduces 
underpricing.
31
 
A number of additional tests were performed to assess the robustness of the relation between IPO 
underpricing and global diversification. First, since underpricing is right-skewed, we redo all of our 
underpricing results using the logarithm of one plus IPO initial return. All results, including using both 
dummy and continuous international business variables, are robust. Second, we redo all of our 
underpricing results for the sample sub-periods: 1981-2006, 2007-2009, and 2010-2012 (i.e., separating 
out the global financial crisis period from 2007 to 2009). We find a strong negative relation between 
underpricing and (dummy and continuous) international business variables during 1981-2006. The 
negative relation is weaker during the sub-periods 2007-2009 and 2010-2012, but this appears to be 
largely attributable to lower power due to smaller samples of IPOs and IPOs with international business 
during these sub-periods. Finally, we include a wide variety of additional variables to explain 
underpricing (e.g., IPO firm age, venture capital backing, underwriter rank, high-technology firm 
dummy, and internet firm dummy). Although many of these additional variables are related to IPO 
underpricing, they have no influence on the relation between underpricing and our international business 
variables. All of these results are available upon request. 
 
4.3. Long-run stock market performance 
 Starting with Ritter (1991), a large number of studies document long-run underperformance of 
newly public firms. Since that time, researchers have sought to explain this phenomenon and identify 
                                                 
31
 For a robustness check, we require that the control IPO is issued in the same year as the treatment IPO. We continue to find 
significantly lower underpricing in the treatment samples. The results are available upon request. 
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factors that influence post-issue performance.
32
 As argued above, we hypothesize that international 
business activity should improve the post-issue performance of newly public firms by augmenting 
domestic cash flows and/or allowing for enhanced diversification of priced cash flow risks. In this 
section, we test this hypothesis by comparing the post-issue performance of IPO firms with and without 
international business activity. 
Table 9 reports calendar time abnormal returns and buy-and-hold returns for portfolios of IPOs 
with and without international business activity over the period from 1981 to 2012. Panels A and B 
report calendar time abnormal returns. For each calendar month, we compute the return on equally-
weighted (Panel A) and value-weighted (Panel B) portfolios of firms with and without international 
business activity that made initial public offerings within the last 3 years and 5 years of the calendar 
month. Based on the monthly time series of portfolio returns, we estimate portfolio alphas using a Fama 
and French (1993) three factor model augmented with a Carhart (1997) momentum factor, a Cooper et al. 
(2008) asset growth factor, a Harvey and Siddique (2000) co-skewness factor, a Lyandres et al. (2008) 
investment factor, and a Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) liquidity factor. For 3- and 5-year rolling time 
periods, the first two columns report portfolio alphas (monthly excess return in percent) for IPOs with 
and without international business activity. The third column for each 3- and 5-year rolling time period 
reports a portfolio alpha based on the monthly time series of the difference between the returns of IPO 
firms with and without international business activity. The t-statistics in parentheses below portfolio 
alphas are computed using robust standard errors. 
 Consistent with studies on IPO long-run performance, we find negative alphas for portfolios of 
IPOs without international business activity. IPOs with international business activity, however, show 
positive alphas. Inspection of the coefficients in the difference columns shows that IPOs with 
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 For a small sample of this work, see Loughran and Ritter (1995), Brav and Gompers (1997), Carter et al. (1998), Teoh et al. 
(1998), and recently Carter et al. (2011), Krishnan et al. (2011), and Brau et al. (2012). 
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international business activity outperform IPOs without international business activity by a wide margin. 
Thus, for example, for the equally-weighted portfolios (Panel A) in the 5-year window, globally 
diversified IPOs outperform purely domestic IPOs by 60 to 109 basis points per month. Also note that 
IPO firms with exports tend to have better long-run performance than IPO firms with foreign sales, but 
the best long-run performance is for IPO firms with both exports and foreign sales. 
 As with the analysis of IPO initial returns, we use propensity score matching (PSM) to mitigate a 
potential problem associated with selection bias. We use the estimated propensity score models reported 
in Panel A of Table 8 to construct treatment and control portfolios of IPO firms with international 
business activity and IPO firms without international business activity. The control portfolios are 
constructed using a one-to-one and one-to-three propensity score NN matching scheme with 
replacement. We report in Panel C of Table 9 the average buy-and-hold returns of treatment 
(international business activity) and control (no international business activity) firms for 24 month 
(BHR24), 36 month (BHR36), 48 month (BHR48), and 60 month (BHR60) periods starting from the 
month after the initial public offering. The z-statistics for the difference in mean buy-and-hold returns 
for treatment and control firms are computed using the analytical estimator of the asymptotic variance of 
matching estimators proposed by Abadie and Imbens (2006, 2008). To conserve space, the table reports 
only the results for one-to-three matching.
33
 
 As seen in Panel C, the average buy-and-hold return for the treatment portfolio is larger than that 
for the control portfolio for all four types of international business activity and for each holding period. 
Furthermore, the differences are generally economically and statistically significant. For example, 
focusing on the first 48 months after the IPO, we see differences of 38, 30, 33, and 45 percentage points 
for IPO firms with exports, foreign sales, exports and/or foreign sales, and exports and foreign sales, 
respectively. 
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 Results for one-to-one matching are available upon request. 
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 Table 10 reports the results of several robustness tests. For all panels in the table, we report 
results only for calendar time abnormal returns of equally-weighted portfolios.
34
 Loughran and Ritter 
(2000) argue that excluding issuing firms when constructing factors is appropriate since it guarantees 
that the factors are not influenced by the stocks in the sample. In Panel A, we report portfolio alphas 
based on a purged eight factor model (i.e., the same eight factors used in Table 9) where the factors are 
constructed after excluding (purging) firms that have publicly issued equity in an IPO or seasoned equity 
offering (SEO) during the prior five years. Observe that our results – IPOs with international business 
activity outperform domestic IPOs in the long run – continue to hold using a purged eight-factor 
model.
35
 
 Ritter (2011) documents that long-run underperformance of IPO firms is present only in firms 
with inflation-adjusted sales less than $50 million. Since the average and median IPO firm in our sample 
with international business activity has inflation-adjusted sales larger than $50 million – the same is true 
for the sample of purely domestic IPO firms (see Table 3) – a natural question is whether the better 
relative long-run performance of IPOs with international business activity is confounded by size. To 
investigate whether size may explain our results, Panel B in Table 10 reports portfolio alphas for IPO 
firms grouped by whether sales in 2009 constant dollars are below or above $50 million.
36
 As seen there, 
although IPOs with inflation-adjusted sales below $50 million tend to have worse long-run performance, 
IPOs with international business activity generally have economically and statistically better 
performance than purely domestic IPOs in both the below and above $50 million dollar sales categories. 
For example, in the 5-year window, globally diversified IPOs outperform purely domestic IPOs by 82 
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 For Panels B and C, we report results for the category exports and/or foreign sales only. Results for value-weighted 
portfolios or buy-and-hold returns, and for the categories exports, foreign sales, and exports and foreign sales, are similar and 
are available on request. 
35
 Our results also are robust to 3-, 4-, 5-, 6-, or 7-factor models. 
36
 Of the 4,994 IPO firms in the sample, 2,057 are classified as small (sales < $50 million) and 2,937 are classified as large 
(sales ≥ $50 million). Of the 2,057 small IPO firms, 462 (22%) have international business activity (399 with exports, 91 with 
foreign sales, and 28 with exports and foreign sales); and of the 2,937 large IPO firms, 922 (31%) have international business 
activity (494 with exports, 557 with foreign sales, and 129 with exports and foreign sales). 
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basis points per month for the below $50 million dollar sales group and by 48 basis points per month for 
the above $50 million dollar sales group. 
 Panel C of Table 10 reports portfolio alphas for IPOs grouped by post-IPO acquisition activity. 
In particular, Brau et al. (2012) find in their IPO sample from 1985 to 2003 that only newly listed firms 
that acquire within a year after their IPO have poor long-run performance. Thus we group IPO firms in 
the sample by whether they are an acquirer in an acquisition within one year after the IPO issue date and 
we examine performance over 3- and 5-year windows following the first year.
37
 As seen in the table, we 
continue to find that IPO firms with international business activity outperform purely domestic IPO 
firms over 3- and 5-year windows in both the acquirer and non-acquirer groups. 
 Finally, although not reported in Table 10, we examine whether our long-run performance results 
are influenced by newly public firms switching from globally diversified to purely domestic or from 
purely domestic to globally diversified in the post IPO period. We purge the global and purely domestic 
IPO samples of firms that switch status in three-year or five-year periods after the IPO year and re-
estimate our calendar time abnormal returns. In results that are available upon request, we continue to 
find that global IPOs outperform purely domestic IPOs over three- and five-year windows after the IPO 
for subsamples of IPO firms that do not switch. 
 Overall, our results show strongly and robustly that IPO firms with international business activity 
outperform purely domestic IPO firms after going public. An implication is that a strategy of a long 
position in a portfolio of IPOs with international business activity and a short position in a portfolio of 
IPOs with purely domestic operations can generate significant abnormal returns. 
 
4.4. Survival analysis 
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 Of the 1,384 IPOs with international business activity (exporter and/or foreign sales), 285 (20.6%) are acquirers; and of the 
3,610 domestic IPOs, 931 (25.8%) are acquirers. 
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Another persistent phenomenon of IPOs is the poor survival rate of newly public firms.
38
 An 
interesting question is whether global diversification favorably influences survival. We can investigate 
this question by estimating a hazard model of the time until failure of our sample of IPOs from 1981 to 
2012. Thus we test whether global diversification decreases the failure rate of newly public firms. 
Of the 4,994 firms in the sample, 1,397 (28%) survive as independent standalone entities from 
the time of the IPO through the end of 2012, 2,595 (52%) are acquired sometime after going public, and 
1,002 (20%) are delisted because of bankruptcy or liquidation. Following Krishnan et al. (2011), we 
define a ―survivor‖ as an IPO firm that continues to operate as an independent entity through the end of 
the sample period or is acquired.
39
 We use a Cox (1972) proportional hazard model to examine the 
influence of global diversification on the survival of IPO firms. In these models, the average probability 
of failure over a unit of time is separable into the product of a baseline hazard function that is 
independent of sample characteristics and a non-negative (exponential) function of a set of 
characteristics explaining failure. We assume that the baseline hazard function is a constant, so that the 
likelihood of failure is independent of the time since going public. All of our results are robust to 
allowing for positive or negative duration dependence. The model is estimated by maximum likelihood 
using a likelihood function shaped by the time to failure defined as the number of months from the IPO 
date to the date of delisting or the end of 2012, a dummy variable which indicates (right) censored data 
for IPO firms that survive beyond the end of 2012, and a set of characteristics explaining failure. 
Table 11 reports results from hazard models of the effect of international business activity on 
IPO survival. Models (1)-(4) estimate, respectively, the effects of Exporter, Foreign Sales, Exporter 
and/or Foreign Sales, and Export and Foreign Sales on the hazard rate (i.e., failure rate) of IPOs. 
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 For example, see Jain and Kini (2000), Fama and French (2004), and Krishnan et al. (2011). 
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 We include acquired firms in the survivor group under the assumption that being acquired means that the firm is an 
attractive target and therefore prospered after going public. As noted below, our results are not affected if we exclude IPO 
firms that are acquired from the analysis. 
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Following Krishnan et al. (2011), the control variables in the models include IPO proceeds, a dummy 
variable for venture capital support, a dummy variable for prestigious underwriter, offer price revision, 
logarithm of firm age at the IPO, logarithm of issuer market capitalization, and market-to-book, as well 
as year and industry fixed effects. All variables are defined in the Appendix. 
Consistent with the hypothesis that global diversification enhances IPO firm survival, observe 
that the coefficient estimates on the international business activity variables are negative (i.e., 
international business activity decreases the hazard rate of IPO firms).
40
 The hazard ratios – reported in 
square brackets below the coefficient estimates – show that the failure rates of IPO firms with exports, 
foreign sales, exports and/or foreign sales, and exports and foreign sales are 71%, 67%, 72%, and 57%, 
respectively, of those of purely domestic IPO firms.
41
 The signs of the coefficients on the other variables 
in the models are consistent with results reported in the literature (see, e.g., Table 5 in Jain and Kini 
(2008) and Table 2 in Krishnan et al. (2011)). Overall, we find strong support for the hypothesis that 
global diversification enhances the survival of newly public firms.
42
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 In this paper, we examine the impact of international business activity on the valuation, 
performance, and survival of IPO firms. We find that globally diversified IPOs have lower underpricing 
than domestic IPOs, which suggests that global diversification mitigates valuation uncertainty and helps 
promote spanning of IPO firms and market completeness. We also document that globally diversified 
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 We continue to find significantly negative coefficient estimates when we replace the international business indicator 
variables with continuous variables based on the proportion of sales derived from international business. Results are available 
upon request. 
41
 Using the coefficient estimates on the international business activity dummy variables reported in Models (1)-(4), the 
hazard ratios (in percent) are computed as 100exp(0.344) = 71%, 100exp(0.397) = 67%, 100exp(0.330) = 72%, and 
100exp(0.571) = 57%, respectively. 
42
 Our results are robust to alternative hazard model specifications such as a Weibull model or a log-logistic hazard function 
for the baseline hazard. Model estimates are also robust when we exclude IPO firms that are acquired and focus only on the 
subsamples of IPO firms that continue to operate as independent firms throughout our sample period (survivors) and that go 
bankrupt or liquidate (failures). All results are available upon request. 
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IPOs have better long-run performance than domestically focused IPOs, which indicates that 
international business activity contributes positively to the performance of newly public firms. Finally, 
we use hazard models to analyze the relation between the survival profile of IPO firms and international 
business activity. We find that globally diversified IPOs have a significantly lower hazard of failure in 
comparison to purely domestic IPOs. 
 The analysis makes several contributions to the literature. Ours is the first study to document the 
important role that global diversification plays in the pricing and subsequent performance of newly 
public firms. The analysis not only identifies an important new factor explaining IPO performance, it 
also provides a valuation dimension to the impact of international business activity on firm performance. 
Importantly, we also contribute to the global diversification literature that has focused on large publicly 
traded firms and has reached few definitive conclusions on the valuation consequences of global 
diversification. Overall, our results suggest that globally diversified firms going public can more fully 
price their shares in the market (i.e., leave less money on the table) and may have better long-run 
performance and survival prospects than purely domestic firms. 
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Appendix: Variable definitions and data sources 
 
 
Variable Description (data source) 
 
 
Underpricing (%) The return from the offer price to the first trading day’s closing price. (SDC/CRSP) 
 
Global diversification dummy variables 
 
Exporter Dummy variable equal to one if an IPO firm reports export sales in the IPO year and the year before. 
 (Compustat/Segment) 
 
Foreign sales Dummy variable equal to one if an IPO firm reports pre-tax foreign income in the IPO year and the year before. 
 (Compustat/Segment) 
 
Exporter and/or foreign sales Dummy variable equal to one if the firm has exports and/or foreign sales in the IPO year and the year before. 
 (Computstat/Segment) 
 
Exporter and foreign sales Dummy variable equal to one if the firm has exports and foreign sales in the IPO year and the year before. 
 (Compustat/Segment) 
 
Global diversification continuous variables 
 
Exports/sales The ratio of export sales to total firm sales at the fiscal year-end immediately prior to the IPO issue date. 
 (Compustat/Segment) 
 
Foreign/sales The ratio of foreign sales to total firm sales at the fiscal year-end immediately prior to the IPO issue date. 
 (Compustat/Segment) 
 
Exp and/or fgn/sales The sum of exports and/or foreign sales to total firm sales at the fiscal year-end immediately prior to the IPO issue 
 date. (Computstat/Segment) 
 
Butler, Keefe, and Kieschnick (2014) robust controls in underpricing regression
43
 
 
Log firm sales Natural logarithm of total firm sales at the fiscal year-end immediately prior to the IPO issue date. (Compustat) 
 
Offer price revision (%) The difference between the offer price and the midpoint of the filing price range. (SDC) 
 
No. of analysts Maximum number of analysts making annual earnings forecasts in any month within one year after the IPO issue 
 date. (I/B/E/S) 
 
Analyst coverage Dummy variable equal to one if at least one analyst makes an earnings forecast within one year after the IPO issue 
 date. (I/B/E/S) 
 
Total liabilities/assets The ratio of total liabilities to total assets at the fiscal year-end immediately prior to the IPO issue date. (Compustat) 
 
Investment bank mkt share (%) The market share of the IPO firm’s lead investment bank in the year the firm went public, where market share in 
 calendar year t is the ratio of the total IPO proceeds the investment bank underwrote (as lead investment bank) in 
 calendar year t to overall IPO proceeds in calendar year t. (SDC) 
 
Avg underpricing in prv 30 days (%) Average first-day return across all IPOs in the 30 days prior to the IPO issue date. (SDC) 
 (continued)  
                                                 
43
 The Butler, Keefe, and Kieschnick (2014) variable ―news stories‖ is replaced with the analyst variables No. of analysts and Analyst coverage. 
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Appendix – continued 
 
 
Variable Description (data source) 
 
 
Avg revision in prv 30 days (%) Average price revision across all IPOs in the 30 days prior to the IPO issue date. (SDC) 
 
Prior 30 day CRSP EW index (%) Average return of the CRSP equally weighted stock return index in the 30 days prior to the IPO issue date (i.e., day 
 31 to day 1, where day 0 is the IPO issue date). (CRSP) 
 
Log(1 + shrs rtd/shrs ofrd) Natural logarithm of one plus the ratio of the shares retained to the shares offered, where the shares retained is the 
 difference between the shares outstanding and the total shares sold (including overallotment shares). The shares 
 outstanding is CRSP shares outstanding, which is the sum of all classes of shares when the firm has multiple classes 
 of stock. (SDC/CRSP) 
 
Offer price revision negative (%) Equals offer price revision if Offer price revision < 0, otherwise 0. (SDC) 
 
Log(industry mkt value/sales) Twelve-month rolling average of the industry market value to sales ratio, where industries are based on Fama-
 French 48 industry groups. The natural logarithm of the IPO firm’s Fama-French industry ratio in month t  1 is 
 matched to each IPO firm, where t is the IPO issue date. Market value is computed as fiscal year-end closing share 
 price time common shares outstanding. (Compustat) 
 
Log(price/sales) Natural logarithm of offer price times shares outstanding to total firm sales, where total firm sales are from the fiscal 
 year-end immediately prior to the IPO date. (SDC/Compustat) 
 
Prior 30 day industry return (%) Industry value-weighted average return in the 30 days prior to the IPO issue date (i.e., day 31 to day 1, where day 
 0 is the IPO issue date), where an IPO firm’s industry is based on the 48 Fama-French industry groups. (CRSP) 
 
Prior 30 day SD of industry return (%) Standard deviation of industry return in the 30 days prior to the IPO issue date. ( CRSP) 
 
Prior 30 day Nasdaq return (%) Average return of the Nasdaq composite index in the 30 days prior to the IPO issue date. (CRSP) 
 
Additional controls for underpricing regressions 
 
Offer price IPO offer price. (SDC) 
 
Hot market dummy Dummy variable equal to one for month t when at least three consecutive months have market heat greater than 
 38, where market heat for a given sample month is the three-month centered moving average number of IPOs 
 and 38 is the top quartile of the monthly moving averages. (SDC) 
 
Cold market dummy Dummy variable equal to one for month t when at least three consecutive months have market heat less than 11, 
 where market heat for a given sample month is the three-month centered moving average  number of IPOs and 11 is 
 the bottom third of the monthly moving averages. (SDC) 
 
Other IPO, firm, and market variables
44
 
 
Issuer market capitalization Offer price time total number of post-IPO shares in millions of 2009 constant dollars. (SDC/CRSP) 
 
Proceeds IPO offer proceeds in millions of 2009 constant dollars. (SDC) 
  (continued)  
                                                 
44
 Except where noted, all firm characteristics (e.g., total assets, total net sales, etc.) are measured at the fiscal year-end immediately after the IPO issue date. 
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Appendix – continued 
 
 
Variable Description (data source) 
 
 
Total assets Book value of total assets in millions of 2009 constant dollars. (Compustat) 
 
Total net sales Net sales in millions of 2009 constant dollars. (Compustat) 
 
Leverage ratio The ratio of long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities to the book value of total assets. (Compustat) 
 
Capex/total assets The ratio of capital expenditures to total assets. (Compustat) 
 
R&D/sales The ratio of research and development expense to net sales, where R&D is set equal to zero when research and 
 development expense is missing. (Compustat) 
 
Market-to-book The ratio of the market value of assets to the book value of assets, where the market value of assets is the book value 
 of assets plus the market value of equity minus the book value of equity. (Compustat) 
 
Productivity Net sales in millions of 2009 constant dollars divided by the number of employees in thousands. The unit of 
 Productivity is thousands of 2009 constant dollars per employee. (Compustat) 
 
Firm age The IPO year minus the firm’s founding year. (Jay Ritter’s website: http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ipodata.htm) 
 
Venture capital dummy Dummy variable equal to one if the IPO firm had/has venture capital support. (SDC) 
 
Prestigious underwriter dummy Dummy variable equal to one if an IPO firm’s lead underwriter has a rank of 8 or 9 based on Jay Ritter’s update of 
 the Carter and Manaster (1990) underwriter rankings, where lowest ranking equals 1 and highest ranking equals 9. 
 (Jay Ritter’s website: http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ipodata.htm) 
 
Acquirer dummy Dummy variable equal to one if an IPO firm is a merger acquirer and the effective date of the merger is before the 
 one-year anniversary of the IPO issue date. (SDC) 
 
High-technology dummy Dummy variable equal to one if an IPO firm has SIC code 2833, 2834, 2835, 2836, 3571, 3572, 3575, 3577, 3578, 
 3661, 3663, 3669, 3674, 3812, 3823, 3825, 3826, 3827, 3829, 3841, 3845, 4812, 4813, 4899, 7370, 7371, 7372, 
 7373, 7374, 7375, 7377,7378, or 7379. (SDC) 
 
Internet dummy Dummy variable equal to one if the IPO is classified as an internet IPO. (Jay Ritter’s website: 
 http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ipodata.htm) 
 
Recession dummy Dummy variable equal to one if the IPO issue date falls within the dates of a recession as defined by the National 
 Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). The NBER recessions during the sample period from 1981 to 2012 are July 
 1981 to November 1982, July 1990 to March 1991, March 2001 to November 2001, and December 2007 to June 
 2009. (SDC/NBER) 
 
Instrument variables 
 
Openness based on volume of exports The ratio of export sales to total nets sales of all firms in the four-digit SIC code of the IPO firm in the year that 
 it goes public. (Compustat/Segment) 
 
Openness based on volume of foreign The ratio of foreign sales to total net sales of all firms in the four-digit SIC code of the IPO firm in the year that it 
 sales goes public. (Compustat/Segement) 
  (continued) 
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Appendix - continued 
 
 
Variable Description (data source) 
 
 
Openness based on volume of exp The ratio of exports and/or foreign sales to total net sales of all firms in the four-digit SIC code of the IPO firm in 
 and/or fgn sales the year that it goes public. (Compustat/Segment) 
 
Openness based on volume of exp The ratio of exports and foreign sales to total net sales of all firms with both exports and foreign sales in the four-
 digit SIC code of the IPO firm in the year that it goes public. (Compustat/Segment) 
 
Openness based on number of firms The ratio of the number of firms with exports to the total number of firms in the four-digit SIC code of the IPO firm 
 with exports in the year that it goes public. (Compustat/Segment) 
 
Openness based on number of firms The ratio of the number of firms with foreign sales to the total number of firms in the four-digit SIC code of the IPO 
 with foreign sales firm in the year that it goes public. (Compustat/Segment) 
 
Openness based on number of firms The ratio of the number of firms with exports and/or foreign sales to the total number of firms in the four digit SIC 
 with exp and/or fgn sales code of the IPO firm in the year that it goes public. (Compustat/Segment) 
 
Openness based on number of firms The ratio of the number of firms with exports and foreign sales to the total number of firms in the four digit SIC 
 with exp and fgn sales code of the IPO firm in the year that it goes public. (Compustat/Segment) 
 
Log of industry productivity Natural logarithm of one plus average industry productivity, where productivity is net sales in millions of 2009 
 constant dollars divided by the number of employees in thousands and industry is based on four-digit SIC code. 
 (Compustat) 
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Table 1 
 
IPO firms with exports and/or foreign sales by year and industry 
 
The table reports the distribution of sample IPO firms with international business activity by year (Panel A) and by industry (Panel B). The sample includes all initial public 
offerings in the SDC database from 1981 to 2012 where firm accounting and stock return data are available in the Compustat and CRSP databases. The sample excludes financial 
and utility firms. IPOs with exports are IPO firms with export activity in the year of and the year before the initial public offering. IPOs with foreign sales are IPO firms with pre-
tax foreign income in the year of and the year before the initial public offering. Data on sales derived from exports are obtained from the Compustat Geographic Segment database 
(variable name SALEXG). IPO firms with foreign sales have pre-tax foreign income reported in the Compustat Industrial Fundamental database (variable name PIFO). 
International business activity intensity is the average by year (Panel A) or industry (Panel B) of export sales, foreign sales, and export sales and/or foreign sales to net total firm 
sales for IPO firms with international business activity. The foreign sales component is the sum of non-domestic segment sales from the Compustat Geographic Segment database. 
All sales figures are from the year prior to the IPO year. In Panel B, the industry distribution follows the Fama-French 12 industry classification scheme (excluding finance and 
utility categories). See the Appendix for the classification of high technology IPOs. 
 
Panel A: Sample distribution by year 
 
 
 No. of IPOs 
 ———————————————————————————— International business activity intensity 
  No. of   Exporter and/or Exporter and ‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒ 
 Year IPOs Exporter Foreign sales foreign sales foreign sales Exports/sales Foreign/sales Exp and/or fgn/sales 
 
 1981 110 31 0 31 0 0.187 0.000 0.187 
 1982 44 16 0 16 0 0.254 0.000 0.254 
 1983 247 70 0 70 0 0.206 0.000 0.206 
 1984 100 25 4 26 3 0.144 0.150 0.162 
 1985 98 18 8 23 3 0.137 0.197 0.157 
 1986 245 48 17 59 6 0.147 0.210 0.177 
 1987 172 32 18 46 4 0.164 0.250 0.205 
 1988 69 24 10 28 6 0.260 0.167 0.281 
 1989 63 20 10 25 5 0.213 0.145 0.240 
 1990 70 21 7 26 2 0.293 0.264 0.296 
 1991 200 44 29 59 14 0.180 0.316 0.276 
 1992 280 65 43 89 19 0.197 0.263 0.260 
 1993 349 84 58 120 22 0.218 0.264 0.262 
 1994 288 64 34 87 11 0.193 0.296 0.258 
 1995 338 115 63 153 25 0.279 0.349 0.351 
 1996 399 85 32 102 15 0.257 0.334 0.323 
 1997 328 64 38 88 14 0.289 0.283 0.339 
 1998 199 31 17 47 1 0.274 0.354 0.324 
 1999 358 14 22 34 2 0.237 0.395 0.353 
 2000 278 11 25 34 2 0.221 0.388 0.369 
 2001 47 1 8 9 0 0.251 0.578 0.552 
 2002 48 1 5 6 0 0.042 0.560 0.525 
 2003 38 1 4 4 1 0.336 0.557 0.643 
 (continued)  
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Table 1 – continued 
 
 No. of IPOs 
 ———————————————————————————— International business activity intensity 
  No. of   Exporter and/or Exporter and ‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒ 
 Year IPOs Exporter Foreign sales foreign sales foreign sales Exports/sales Foreign/sales Exp and/or fgn/sales 
 
 2004 114 1 23 24 0 0.069 0.368 0.358 
 2005 99 3 21 23 1 0.218 0.396 0.395 
 2006 100 1 26 27 0 0.186 0.397 0.398 
 2007 106 2 28 29 1 0.126 0.417 0.428 
 2008 14 1 2 3 0 0.062 0.486 0.384 
 2009 32 0 14 14 0 0.000 0.436 0.436 
 2010 52 0 24 24 0 0.000 0.387 0.387 
 2011 52 0 27 27 0 0.000 0.416 0.416 
 2012 57 0 31 31 0 0.000 0.366 0.366 
 
 Total 4,994 893 648 1,384 157 0.223 0.337 0.297 
 
Panel B. Sample distribution by industry 
 
 
 No. of IPOs 
 ———————————————————————————— International business activity intensity 
  No. of   Exporter and/or Exporter and ‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒ 
 Year IPOs Exporter Foreign sales foreign sales foreign sales Exports/sales Foreign/sales Exp and/or fgn/sales 
 
Consumer nondurables 224 27 31 56 2 0.119 0.305 0.205 
 
Consumer durables 119 33 22 49 6 0.161 0.326 0.242 
 
Manufacturing 383 102 89 163 28 0.208 0.291 0.284 
 
Oil, gas, and coal extraction 120 4 13 16 1 0.201 0.455 0.425 
 
Chemicals and allied products 63 18 18 31 5 0.119 0.331 0.254 
 
Business equipment 1,737 552 301 754 99 0.231 0.365 0.307 
 
Telephone and television 218 9 12 20 1 0.438 0.409 0.457 
 
Wholesale and retail 678 29 42 67 4 0.157 0.257 0.217 
 
Healthcare, medical 692 94 47 133 8 0.248 0.384 0.317 
equipment, and drugs 
 
Other 760 25 73 95 3 0.296 0.271 0.302 
 
High technology 2,225 597 319 816 100 0.241 0.370 0.315 
 
Not high technology 2,769 296 329 568 57 0.188 0.305 0.270 
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Table 2 
 
Descriptive statistics and correlations for international business activity measures and IPO and firm characteristics 
 
The sample includes all initial public offerings (IPOs) in the SDC database from 1981 to 2012 where firm accounting and stock 
return data are available in the Compustat and CRSP databases. The sample excludes financial and utility firms. Panel A 
reports descriptive statistics and Panel B reports Pearson correlation coefficients. All variables are defined in the Appendix and 
all variables except dummy variables are winsorized at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles. As noted in the Appendix, variables 
specified in dollars (e.g., Issuer market capitalization, Proceeds, Total assets, and Total net sales) are in constant 2009 dollars. 
We use ***, **, and * to denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
 
Panel A. Descriptive statistics 
 
 
 Variable Mean Std. Dev. 1
st
 Quartile Median 3
rd
 Quartile N 
 
 
 Underpricing (%) 19.550 35.872 0.625 7.759 23.611 4,994 
 
 Global diversification dummy variables 
 
 Exporter 0.179     4,994 
 
 Foreign sales 0.130     4,994 
 
 Exporter and/or foreign sales 0.277     4,994 
 
 Exporter and foreign sales 0.031     4,994 
 
 Global diversification continuous variables for the subsample of IPOs with international business 
 
 Exports/sales 0.223 0.169 0.094 0.172 0.314 893 
 
 Foreign/sales 0.337 0.225 0.139 0.297 0.502 511 
 
 Exp and/or fgn/sales 0.297 0.224 0.125 0.240 0.424 1,284 
 
 Butler, Keefe, and Kieschnick (2014) robust controls for underpricing regressions 
 
 Log firm sales 3.645 1.927 2.607 3.758 4.834 4,994 
 
 Offer price revision (%) -0.881 14.400 6.667 0.000 3.704 4,994 
 
 No. of analysts 2.594 2.285 1.000 2.000 4.000 4,994 
 
 Analyst coverage 0.773     4,994 
 
 Total liabilities/assets 0.739 0.468 0.466 0.690 0.879 4,994 
 
 Investment bank mkt share (%) 5.481 7.690 0.368 2.244 7.224 4,994 
 
 Avg underpricing in prv 30 days (%) 22.410 26.000 9.210 14.200 22.150 4,994 
 
 Avg revision in prv 30 days (%) 1.518 11.358 4.639 0.000 3.699 4,994 
 
 Prior 30 day CRSP EW index (%) 2.187 4.261 0.485 2.453 4.836 4,994 
 
 Log(1 + shrs rtd/shrs ofrd) 1.264 0.480 0.978 1.250 1.537 4,994 
 
 Offer price revision negative (%) 4.969 9.368 6.667 0.000 0.000 4,994 
 
 Log(industry mkt value/sales) 2.280 1.695 0.923 2.097 3.530 4,994 
 
 Log(price/sales) 1.472 1.824 0.205 1.148 2.404 4,994 
 
 Prior 30 day industry return (%) 1.531 5.870 2.079 1.613 4.893 4,994 
 
 Prior 30 day SD of industry return (%) 1.148 0.560 0.771 1.002 1.345 4,994 
 
 Prior 30 day Nasdaq return (%) 1.451 5.423 1.652 1.630 4.722 4,994 
 
 Additional controls for underpricing regressions 
 
 Offer price 12.270 4.626 9.000 12.000 15.000 4,994 
 
 Hot market dummy 0.521     4,994 
 
 Cold market dummy 0.095     4,994 
 (continued) 
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Table 2 – continued 
 
 Variable Mean Std. Dev. 1
st
 Quartile Median 3
rd
 Quartile N 
 
 
 Other IPO and firm variables (firm variables are measured at the fiscal year end immediately after the IPO) 
 
 Issuer mkt cap 235.523 354.719 47.786 108.015 265.234 4,994 
 
 Proceeds 57.460 81.620 15.000 32.000 64.400 4,994 
 
 Total assets 245.093 501.197 43.522 88.364 196.048 4,994 
 
 Total net sales 222.734 480.720 26.079 67.836 182.915 4,994 
 
 Leverage ratio 0.156 0.202 0.004 0.057 0.258 4,992 
 
 Capex/total assets 0.085 0.100 0.025 0.049 0.103 4,950 
 
 R&D/sales 0.058 0.088 0.000 0.008 0.092 4,994 
 
 Market-to-book 3.315 3.129 1.577 2.372 3.741 4,976 
 
 Productivity 270.800 330.600 104.100 183.600 291.500 4,857 
 
 Firm age 14.950 18.840 4.000 8.000 16.000 4,974 
 
 Venture capital dummy 0.441     4,994 
 
 Prestigious underwriter dummy 0.512     4,994 
 
 Acquirer dummy 0.244     4,994 
 
 High-technology dummy 0.446     4,994 
 
 Internet dummy 0.077     4,994 
 
 Instruments for global diversification variables 
 
 Openness based on volume 0.030 0.043 0.000 0.009 0.045 4,994 
 of exports 
 
 Openness based on volume 0.192 0.189 0.012 0.138 0.335 4,994 
 of foreign sales 
 
 Openness based on volume 0.222 0.198 0.037 0.168 0.377 4,994 
 of exp and/or fgn sales 
 
 Openness based on volume 0.053 0.091 0.000 0.002 0.065 4,994 
 of exp and fgn sales 
 
 Openness based on number of 0.176 0.192 0.012 0.100 0.301 4,994 
 firms with exports 
 
 Openness based on number of 0.147 0.132 0.043 0.123 0.212 4,994 
 firms with foreign sales 
 
 Openness based on number of 0.283 0.213 0.096 0.250 0.443 4,994 
 firms with exp and/or fgn sales 
 
 Openness based on number of 0.041 0.062 0.000 0.010 0.063 4,994 
 firms with exp and fgn sales 
 
 Log of industry productivity 5.462 0.611 5.175 5.386 5.706 4,994 
 (continued) 
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Table 2 – continued 
 
Panel B. Pearson correlation coefficients between underpricing, international business variables, and instrumental variables 
 
 
        Openness Openness Openness Openness Openness Openness Log 
  Foreign Exp and/or Exp and Exports/ Foreign/ Exp and/or volume volume vol exp firms firms firms exp industry 
 Exporter sales fgn sales fgn sales sales sales fgn/sales exports fgn sales and/or fgn exports fgn sales and/or fgn productivity 
 
 
Underpricing 0.040*** 0.049*** 0.056*** 0.039*** 0.023* 0.029** 0.037*** 0.036*** 0.046*** 0.034*** 0.042*** 0.002 0.013 0.003 
 
 
Exporter 1.000  
 
 
Foreign sales 0.064*** 1.000 
 
 
Exp and/or fgn sales 0.754*** 0.624*** 1.000 
 
 
Exp and fgn sales 0.386*** 0.467*** 0.291*** 1.000 
 
 
Exports/sales 0.767*** 0.029** 0.578*** 0.258*** 1.000 
 
 
Foreign/sales 0.000 0.715*** 0.446*** 0.233*** 0.032** 1.000 
 
 
Exp and/or fgn/sales 0.506*** 0.547*** 0.715*** 0.332*** 0.655*** 0.728*** 1.000 
 
 
Openness volume 0.406*** 0.076*** 0.329*** 0.195*** 0.395*** 0.046*** 0.302*** 1.000 
exports 
 
Openness volume 0.055*** 0.212*** 0.182*** 0.063*** 0.056*** 0.229*** 0.209*** 0.063*** 1.000 
foreign sales 
 
Openness vol exp 0.142*** 0.221*** 0.247*** 0.103*** 0.142*** 0.231*** 0.268*** 0.282*** 0.975*** 1.000 
and/or fgn sales 
 
Openness firms 0.567*** 0.088*** 0.457*** 0.241*** 0.465*** 0.044*** 0.339*** 0.728*** 0.124*** 0.280*** 1.000 
exports 
 
Openness firms 0.081*** 0.304*** 0.259*** 0.100*** 0.063*** 0.293*** 0.259*** 0.146*** 0.590*** 0.599*** 0.239*** 1.000 
foreign sales 
 
Openness firms exp 0.409*** 0.248*** 0.464*** 0.187*** 0.337*** 0.220*** 0.387*** 0.535*** 0.470*** 0.570*** 0.767*** 0.775*** 1.000 
and/or fgn sales 
 
Log industry 0.101*** 0.142*** 0.092*** 0.084*** 0.035** 0.049*** 0.030** 0.012 0.051*** 0.047*** 0.077*** 0.118*** 0.035*** 1.000 
productivity 
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Table 3 
 
Comparison of IPO and firm characteristics for IPOs with and without international business activity 
 
Firms with international business activity have exports and/or foreign sales in the year of and the year before the initial 
public offering. All variables are defined in the Appendix. All dollar values are in constant 2009 dollars. The significance 
of the difference in means is based on a t-test that assumes unequal variances across groups when a test of equal variances 
is rejected at the 10 percent level. The significance of the difference in medians is based on a Wilcoxon rank-sum test. We 
use ***, **, and * to denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
 
 Exporter and/or No exports or 
 foreign sales foreign sales 
 (1,384 IPOs) (3,610 IPOs) Difference in 
 ‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒ ‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒ ‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒ 
 Variable Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
 
 Underpricing (%) 16.290 8.233 20.800 7.692 4.510*** 0.541 
 
 Control variables in underpricing regression 
 
 Log firm sales 4.156 3.985 3.450 3.626 0.706
***
 0.359
***
 
 
 Offer price revision 0.112 0.000 1.261 0.000 1.373*** 0.000*** 
 
 No. of analysts 2.896 3.000 2.478 2.000 0.418
***
 1.000
***
 
 
 Analyst coverage 0.814  0.757  0.057
***
 
 
 Total liabilities/assets 0.692 0.636 0.757 0.710 0.065*** 0.074*** 
 
 Invt banker mkt share 6.428 3.085 5.118 1.942 1.310
***
 1.143
***
 
 
 Avg undpreg prv 30 days 17.760 13.600 24.190 14.400 6.430*** 0.800*** 
 
 Avg rvs prv 30 days 0.176 0.000 2.033 0.000 1.857*** 0.000* 
 
 Prior 30 day CRSP EW idx 1.990 2.283 2.262 2.490 0.272** 0.207** 
 
 Log(1 + shrs rtd/shrs ofd) 1.284 1.274 1.257 1.243 0.027
*
 0.031
**
 
 
 Offer price revision neg 5.073 0.000 4.929 0.000 0.144 0.000 
 
 Log(ind mkt value/sales) 2.158 1.782 2.327 2.190 0.169*** 0.408** 
 
 Log(price/sales) 1.122 1.088 1.606 1.183 0.484*** 0.095*** 
 
 Prior 30 day industry return 1.469 1.420 1.555 1.688 0.086 0.268 
 
 Prior 30 day SD ind return 1.123 1.006 1.158 1.001 0.035** 0.005 
 
 Prior 30 day Nasdaq return 1.153 1.358 1.566 1.704 0.413** 0.346** 
 
 Offer price 12.740 12.000 12.090 12.000 0.650
***
 0.000
***
 
 
 Hot market dummy 0.491  0.533  0.042*** 
 
 Cold market dummy 0.120  0.085  0.035
***
 
 
Other IPO and firm variables 
 
 Issuer mkt cap 271.765 118.338 221.629 104.980 50.136
***
 13.358
***
 
 
 Proceeds 67.761 32.400 53.513 32.000 14.248
***
 0.400
***
 
 
 Total assets 313.432 92.591 218.886 87.382 94.546
***
 5.209
***
 
 
 Total net sales 294.730 81.241 195.109 62.612 99.621
***
 18.629
***
 
 
 Leverage ratio 0.131 0.033 0.165 0.066 0.034*** 0.033*** 
 
 Capex/total assets 0.063 0.044 0.094 0.052 0.031*** 0.008*** 
 
 R&D/sales 0.075 0.062 0.051 0.000 0.024
***
 0.062
***
 
 
 Market-to-book 3.140 2.428 3.382 2.342 0.242*** 0.086* 
 (continued) 
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Table 3 – continued 
 
 Exporter and/or No exports or 
 foreign sales foreign sales 
 (1,384 IPOs) (3,610 IPOs) Difference in 
 ‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒ ‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒ ‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒ 
 Variable Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
 
 Productivity 296.794 222.737 260.656 160.887 36.138
***
 61.850
***
 
 
 Firm age 17.550 9.000 13.960 8.000 3.590
***
 1.000
***
 
 
 Venture capital dummy 0.480  0.426  0.054
***
 
 
 Prestigious underwriter dummy 0.572  0.489  0.083
***
 
 
 Acquirer dummy 0.206  0.258  0.052*** 
 
 High-technology dummy 0.590  0.390  0.200
***
 
 
 Internet dummy 0.039  0.091  0.052*** 
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Table 4 
 
The effect of international business activity on IPO underpricing 
 
The dependent variable is the initial offering return (in percent) which is calculated from the offer price to the closing price at the end 
of the first day of trading. The international business activity variables Exporter, Foreign sales, Exporter and/or foreign sales, and 
Exporter and foreign sales are dummy variables which are defined in the Appendix. All other independent variables are defined in the 
Appendix. Models (1), (3), and (5) use the full sample. Model (2) excludes IPOs with foreign sales that do not have exports (i.e., the 
coefficient on the dummy variable Exporter measures the difference in underpricing between IPOs with exports and IPOs without any 
international business activity). Model (4) excludes IPOs with exports that do not have foreign sales (i.e., the coefficient on the 
dummy variable Foreign sales measures the difference in underpricing between IPOs with foreign sales and IPOs without any 
international business activity). Model (6) excludes IPOs that have either exports or foreign sales (i.e., the coefficient on the dummy 
variable Exports and foreign sales measures the difference in underpricing between IPOs with exports and foreign sales and IPOs 
without any international business activity). All regressions include year and Fama-French 48-industry fixed effects. We report t-
statistics in parentheses below parameter estimates that are computed using robust standard errors clustered by industry. We use ***, 
**, and * to denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
 
 Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
 
 Exporter 2.225* 3.097** 
  (1.78) (2.15) 
 
 Foreign sales   3.491*** 4.249*** 
    (2.97) (2.85) 
 
 Exporter and/or foreign sales     3.075** 
      (2.50) 
 
 Exporter and foreign sales      5.708** 
       (2.31) 
 
 Log firm sales 8.874*** 9.266*** 8.586*** 8.450*** 8.676*** 9.142*** 
  (5.08) (5.04) (4.97) (4.42) (5.06) (4.41) 
 
 Offer price revision 0.458
***
 0.425
***
 0.453
***
 0.424
***
 0.459
***
 0.378
***
 
  (8.06) (7.65) (7.80) (7.56) (8.07) (6.69) 
 
 No. of analysts 1.515
***
 1.521
***
 1.504
***
 1.634
***
 1.525
***
 1.662
***
 
  (5.84) (5.64) (5.78) (5.96) (5.76) (5.14) 
 
 Total liabilities/assets 1.991** 1.874* 1.859** 2.302** 1.962** 2.258** 
  (2.21) (1.90) (2.06) (2.42) (2.21) (2.09) 
 
 Investment bank mkt share 0.565
***
 0.617
***
 0.575
***
 0.574
***
 0.571
***
 0.619
***
 
  (5.04) (5.25) (5.13) (4.83) (5.13) (4.70) 
 
 Avg underpricing in prv 30 days 0.235
***
 0.242
***
 0.235
***
 0.231
***
 0.236
***
 0.239
***
 
  (3.74) (3.87) (3.73) (3.72) (3.75) (3.87) 
 
 Avg revision in prv 30 days 0.044 0.066 0.046 0.039 0.046 0.063 
  (0.68) (0.94) (0.71) (0.066) (0.70) (0.95) 
 
 Prior 30 day CRSP EW index 0.640*** 0.590** 0.629*** 0.715*** 0.644*** 0.660*** 
  (3.23) (2.46) (3.13) (3.64) (3.24) (2.72) 
 
 Log(1 + shrs rtd/shrs ofrd) 13.26
***
 14.43
***
 13.16
***
 13.63
***
 13.20
***
 15.14
***
 
  (5.96) (5.62) (5.90) (5.76) (5.97) (5.39) 
 
 Offer price revision negative 0.350*** 0.310*** 0.343*** 0.312*** 0.351*** 0.255*** 
  (4.59) (4.25) (4.45) (4.16) (4.58) (3.56) 
 
 Log(Industry mkt value/sales) 1.011 1.320 0.965 0.953 1.005 1.305 
  (1.43) (1.64) (1.40) (1.17) (1.45) (1.35) 
 
 Log (price/sales) 5.761*** 6.227*** 5.590*** 5.392*** 5.656*** 6.041*** 
  (4.61) (4.55) (4.51) (3.91) (4.61) (3.86) 
 (continued) 
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Table 4 – continued 
 
 Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
 
 Prior  30 day industry return 0.271 0.260 0.279 0.241 0.277 0.216 
  (1.60) (1.54) (1.64) (1.27) (1.64) (1.16) 
 
 Prior 30 day SD of industry return 4.310
***
 5.204
***
 4.381
***
 3.995
***
 4.350
***
 4.861
***
 
  (3.56) (4.47) (3.51) (3.21) (3.60) (4.07) 
 
 Prior 30 day Nasdaq return 1.114
***
 1.074
***
 1.098
***
 1.184
***
 1.107
***
 1.155
***
 
  (4.24) (3.41) (4.14) (4.21) (4.22) (3.40) 
 
 Offer price 2.081
***
 2.231
***
 2.058
***
 2.130
***
 2.070
***
 3.324
***
 
  (3.44) (3.49) (3.42) (3.15) (3.44) (3.17) 
 
 Hot market dummy 0.209 0.065 0.207 0.346 0.172 0.245 
  (0.13) (0.04) (0.13) (0.19) (0.11) (0.14) 
 
 Cold market dummy 1.269 3.261 1.346 1.528 1.363 3.640 
  (0.63) (0.99) (0.66) (0.66) (0.69) (0.92) 
 
 Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
 Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
 Adjusted R
2
 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.43 
 
 Observations 4,994 4,503 4,994 4,258 4,994 3,767 
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Table 5 
 
The differential effect of exporter versus foreign seller and the effect of multiple 
foreign regions on underpricing 
 
The dependent variable is the initial offering return (in percent) which is calculated from the offer price to 
the closing price at the end of the first day of trading. The international business activity variables Exporter 
and Foreign sales are dummy variables that are equal to one if an IPO firm reports export sales or pre-tax 
foreign income, respectively, in the IPO year and the year before. Multiple regions is a dummy variable 
equal to one if an IPO firm has foreign sales in more than one geographic region, where the regions are 
Asian and Pacific, Europe, North America, South America, and Africa and the Middle East. Model (1) is 
estimated using only global IPOs with exports and/or foreign sales. Model (2) excludes IPOs with both 
exports and foreign sales. Model (3) is estimated using the full sample of global and domestic IPOs. Model 
(4) is estimated using only global IPOs with foreign sales. The control variables in the regressions are the 
same as those used in Table 4 and are defined in the Appendix. All regressions include year and Fama-
French 48-industry fixed effects. We report t-statistics in parentheses below parameter estimates that are 
computed using robust standard errors clustered by industry. We use *** and ** to denote significance at 
the 1% and 5% levels respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
 
Exporter 1.605 2.198 
 (1.04) (1.25) 
 
Foreign sales   2.751** 
   (2.51) 
 
Foreign sales × Multiple regions   7.039*** 8.109*** 
   (3.14) (3.03) 
 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Adjusted R2 0.44 0.43 0.43 0.40 
 
Observations 1,384 1,227 4,994 648 
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Table 6 
 
The effect of international business intensity on IPO underpricing 
 
The dependent variable is the initial offering return (in percent) which is calculated from the offer price to the closing price at the end 
of the first day of trading. The international business intensity variables Exports/sales, Foreign/sales, and Exp and/or fgn/sales are 
defined in the Appendix. Models (2), (4), and (6) include the squares of the international business intensity variables. Panel A reports 
regressions that use the full sample of global and domestic IPOs and sets the international business intensity variables equal to zero for 
purely domestic IPO firms. Panel B reports regressions using the subsample of global IPO firms (i.e., only IPO firms with exports 
and/or foreign operations). The control variables in the regressions are the same as those used in Table 4 and are defined in the 
Appendix. All regressions include year and Fama-French 48-industry fixed effects. We report t-statistics in parentheses below 
parameter estimates that are computed using robust standard errors clustered by industry. We use ***, **, and * to denote significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
 
Panel A. Full sample of global and domestic IPOs 
 
Exports/sales 8.761* 13.001 
 (1.82) (1.43) 
 
Squared exports/sales  8.992 
  (0.56) 
 
Foreign/sales   3.733** 7.465** 
   (2.22) (2.13) 
 
Squared foreign/sales    3.517 
    (1.46) 
 
Exp and/or fgn/sales     5.920*** 9.863** 
     (2.84) (2.18) 
 
Squared exp and/or fgn/sales      4.313 
      (1.31) 
 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Adjusted R
2 
0.43 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.43 
 
Observations 4,994 4,994 4,994 4,994 4,994 4,994 
 
Panel B. Subsample of global IPOs 
 
Exports/sales 12.071*** 3.734 
 (3.92) (0.33) 
 
Squared exports/sales  13.74 
  (0.77) 
 
Foreign/sales   2.851 3.355 
   (0.77) (0.68) 
 
Squared foreign/sales    0.323 
    (0.16) 
 
Exp and/or fgn/sales     3.113** 6.699** 
     (2.15) (2.21) 
 
Squared exp and/or fgn/sales      2.886 
      (1.23) 
 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Adjusted R
2 
0.48 0.48 0.43 0.43 0.45 0.45 
 
Observations 893 893 511 511 1,284 1,284 
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Table 7 
 
Two-stage IV estimation of the effect of international business activity on IPO underpricing 
 
The table reports the second stage of a 2SLS model where the dependent variable is the initial offering return (in percent) which is 
calculated from the offer price to the closing price at the end of the first day of trading. The variables )Exporter(Pˆ , )salesForeign(Pˆ ,
sales)foreign and/or Exporter (Pˆ , and )salesforeignandExporter(Pˆ are fitted probabilities from a first stage probit model estimated 
with all of the independent variables in the regressions of Table 4 including year and industry dummies plus the instrumental variables 
―openness‖ and logarithm of industry productivity. Models (1) and (2) in Panel A define ―openness‖ as the ratio of export sales to total 
net sales of all firms on Compustat in the four-digit SIC code of the IPO firm in the year that it goes public. Models (3) and (4), model 
(5), and model (6) in Panel A analogously define ―openness‖ using foreign sales, exports and/or foreign sales, and exports and foreign 
sales, respectively. Exports and foreign sales are obtained from the Compustat Geographic Segment database. Panel B computes 
―openness‖ based on the number of firms with international business activity. Thus, models (1) and (2), models (3) and (4), model (5), 
and model (6) in Panel B define ―openness‖ as the ratio of the number of firms in the four-digit SIC code of the IPO firm in the year 
that it goes public with exports, foreign sales, exports and/or foreign sales, and exports and foreign sales, respectively, to the total 
number of firms in the four-digit SIC code of the IPO firm in the year that it goes public. Models (1), (3), and (5) use the full sample. 
Model (2) excludes IPOs with foreign sales that do not have exports. Model (4) excludes IPOs with exports that do not have foreign 
sales. Model (6) excludes IPOs that have either exports or foreign sales. The control variables and year and industry dummies are the 
same as those used in the regressions of Table 4. We use the Cragg-Donald statistic to assess whether the instruments are weak. When 
there is one endogenous regressor as in our models (i.e., international business activity), the Cragg-Donald statistic has an F 
distribution under the null hypothesis that the instruments have no explanatory power in the first stage regression. With one 
endogenous regressor and two excluded instruments, the critical value (Stock-Yogo weak ID test) for the Cragg-Donald statistic for 10% 
maximal size distortion is 19.93. Since we have two unique instruments and one endogenous regressor in each IV regression model, 
we use the Sargan test for overidentifying restrictions to assess whether the instruments are uncorrelated with the second-stage error. If 
the test statistic – which is distributed chi-square – exceeds the critical value we reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are 
uncorrelated with the structural error and conclude that the instruments are not exogenous. We report t-statistics in parentheses below 
parameter estimates that are computed using robust standard errors clustered by industry. We report the effect of a one standard 
deviation increase in the fitted probability on underpricing in square brackets below parameter estimates. We use ***, **, and * to 
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
 
Panel A. Instrumental variables: Openness based on sales of firms with international business and log of industry productivity 
 
 
)Exporter(Pˆ  20.974*** 23.111*** 
 (3.60) (3.41) 
 [4.47%] [5.38%] 
 
)salesForeign(Pˆ    17.712*** 20.129*** 
   (3.04) (2.84) 
   [3.08%] [4.01%] 
 
sales)foreign and/or Exporter (Pˆ      20.098** 
     (2.56) 
     [4.74%] 
 
)salesforeignandExporter(Pˆ       17.231 
      (1.50) 
      [2.52%] 
 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Cragg-Donald statistic 127.38*** 123.60*** 33.59*** 36.64*** 36.64*** 68.85*** 
 
Sargan test p-value 0.534 0.549 0.257 0.424 0.424 0.745 
 
Adjusted-R
2
 0.41 0.41 0.42 0.42 0.39 0.47 
 
Observations 4,358 3,994 4,479 3,882 4,985 2,215 
 (continued)  
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Table 7 – continued 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
 
Panel B. Instrumental variables: Openness based on number of firms with international business and log of industry productivity 
 
 
)Exporter(Pˆ  9.717*** 10.950*** 
 (2.85) (2.86) 
 [2.32%] [2.86%] 
 
)salesForeign(Pˆ    18.807*** 21.366*** 
   (3.43) (3.10) 
   [3.31%] [4.32%] 
 
sales)foreign and/or Exporter (Pˆ      11.298*** 
     (2.82) 
     [2.88%] 
 
)salesforeignandExporter(Pˆ       15.330 
      (1.52) 
      [2.21%] 
 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Cragg-Donald F-statistic 426.02*** 424.81*** 59.64*** 62.76*** 202.98*** 114.08*** 
 
Sargan test p-value 0.533 0.549 0.591 0.795 0.570 0.744 
 
Adjusted-R
2
 0.43 0.44 0.42 0.41 0.42 0.47 
 
Observations 4,358 3,994 4,479 3,882 4,985 2,215 
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Table 8 
 
Propensity score analysis to correct for selection bias in the relation between international 
business activity and IPO underpricing 
 
The table presents results from propensity score analysis where underpricing of IPOs with international business 
activity (treatment group) is compared to underpricing of IPOs without international business activity (control 
group). Panel A reports marginal effects from probit models estimated using IPOs with and without international 
business activity. The probit models are used to compute propensity scores (probability of international business 
activity) to match treatment and control firms. The dependent variables in Models (1), (2), (3), and (4) are the 
dummy variables Exporter, Foreign sales, Exporter and/or foreign sales and Exporter and foreign sales, 
respectively. Model (1) excludes IPOs with foreign sales that do not also have exports. Model (2) excludes IPOs 
with exports that do not also have foreign sales. Model (4) excludes IPOs with exports or foreign sales. All variables 
are defined in the Appendix. All regressions use the Fama-French 48 industry groups to control for industry fixed 
effects. In parentheses below the coefficient estimates are z-statistics computed using robust standard errors. Based 
on the estimated propensity scores for the treatment and control samples, we use nearest-neighbor (NN) matching 
with replacement to implement one-to-one and one-to-three matching of treatment and control samples. We allow 
for replacement because a control IPO can be a best match for more than one treatment IPO. Panel B reports a 
balance check for Model (1) in Panel A where we compare the means of the covariates for the treatment group (IPO 
firms with exports) to those of the one-to-one NN-matched control group of IPOs without international business 
activity. This goodness of fit test assesses whether the means of the covariates in the propensity score model (i.e., 
the independent variables in the probit regression of Panel A) are statistically indistinguishable in treatment and 
control groups. Although unreported in Panel B, all treatment and control groups examined in Panel C pass the 
balance test. Panel C reports average underpricing for treatment and control groups based on one-to-one and one-to-
three propensity score NN matching. In the latter case, each IPO firm with international business activity is matched 
with three closest fit IPO firms without international business activity. We report a z-statistic for the difference in 
average underpricing that is computed using the analytical estimator of the asymptotic variance of matching 
estimators proposed by Abadie and Imbens (2006, 2008). We use ***, **, and * to denote significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
 
Panel A. Probit model estimations used to predict international business activity for propensity score matching 
 
 
 Dependent variable = 1 for 
 ‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒ 
   Exporter and/or Exporter and 
 Exporter Foreign sales foreign sales foreign sales 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
 Log productivity 0.047
***
 0.016** 0.020** 0.003 
  (5.36) (2.22) (2.46) (0.50) 
 
 Log firm sales 0.242
***
 0.074
***
 0.058
***
 0.042
***
 
  (3.81) (14.06) (9.49) (8.37) 
 
 Capex/total assets 0.089 0.265*** 0.286*** 0.113 
  (1.10) (3.63) (3.61) (1.54) 
 
 Log(1 + firm age) 0.022
***
 0.018
***
 0.028
***
 0.011
**
 
  (2.80) (2.75) (3.66) (2.02) 
 
 Leverage ratio 0.216*** 0.041 0.135*** 0.048* 
  (5.26) (1.36) (3.68) (1.65) 
 
 R&D/sales 0.463
***
 0.457
***
 0.513
***
 0.372
***
 
  (5.96) (6.42) (6.31) (6.71) 
 
 No. of analysts 0.018*** 0.007*** 0.002 0.008*** 
  (5.38) (2.83) (0.59) (3.24) 
 
 Prestigious underwriter 0.017 0.008 0.006 0.012 
 dummy (1.34) (0.71) (0.49) (1.28) 
 
 Recession dummy 0.009 0.064** 0.015 0.070** 
  (0.30) (2.11) (0.52) (2.06) 
 
 Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 8 – continued 
 
Panel A. Probit model estimations used to predict international business activity for propensity score matching 
 
 
 Dependent variable = 1 for 
 ‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒ 
   Exporter and/or Exporter and 
 Exporter Foreign sales foreign sales foreign sales 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
 Pseudo R
2
 0.21 0.25 0.20 0.27 
 
 Chi-square statistic 899.50
***
 882.75
***
 1,151.56
***
 313.29
***
 
 
 Observed probability 0.22 0.15 0.28 0.06 
 
 Predicted probability 0.22 0.15 0.28 0.06 
 
 Observations 4,001 4,044 4,786 2,519 
 
Panel B. Balance test: Mean comparison of covariates from probit Model (1) 
 
 
  Treatment group Control group Difference ǀt-Statisticǀ 
 
 Log productivity 5.427 5.447 0.020 0.55 
 
 Log firm sales 4.099 4.082 0.017 0.25 
 
 Capex/total assets 0.065 0.067 0.002 0.81 
 
 Log(1 + firm age) 2.342 2.382 0.040 1.00 
 
 Leverage ratio 0.094 0.091 0.003 0.47 
 
 R&D/sales 0.085 0.084 0.001 0.19 
 
 No. of analysts 2.257 2.363 0.106 1.12 
 
 Prestigious underwriter dummy 0.477 0.473 0.004 0.14 
 
Panel C. Average IPO underpricing (in percent) for treatment and control firms 
 
 
 Model Treatment group Control group Difference ǀz-Statisticǀ 
 
C1. One-to-one match 
 
(1) Exporter 16.453 24.688 8.235 4.42*** 
 
(2) Foreign sales 14.986 23.891 8.905 3.47*** 
 
(3) Exporter and/or foreign sales 16.294 24.343 8.049 4.81*** 
 
(4) Exporter and foreign sales 11.800 23.845 12.045 2.86*** 
 
C2. One-to-three match 
 
(1) Exporter 16.453 24.159 7.706 5.01*** 
 
(2) Foreign sales 14.986 23.683 8.697 4.78*** 
 
(3) Exporter and/or foreign sales 16.294 23.958 7.664 5.57*** 
 
(4) Exporter and foreign sales 11.800 23.154 11.354 4.44*** 
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Table 9 
 
Long-run performance of IPO firms with and without international business activity 
 
Calendar time abnormal returns (in percent) and buy-and-hold returns are reported for IPOs with and without international business activity over the period from 1981 to 2012. 
Panels A and B report calendar time abnormal returns. For each calendar month, we calculate the return on equally-weighted (Panel A) and value-weighted (Panel B) portfolios of 
firms with and without international business activity that made initial public offerings within the last 3 years and 5 years of the calendar month. Based on the monthly time series 
of portfolio returns, we estimate portfolio alphas using an eight-factor model. The eight factors include the three Fama-French (1993) factors, the Carhart (1997) momentum factor, 
the Cooper et al. (2008) asset growth factor, the Harvey and Siddique (2000) co-skewness factor, the Lyandres et al. (2008) investment factor, and the Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) 
liquidity factor. For 3 and 5 year rolling time periods, the first two columns in Panels A and B report portfolio alphas (monthly excess return in percent) for IPOs with international 
business activity and without international business activity, respectively. The third column for each 3 and 5 year rolling time period in Panels A and B reports a portfolio alpha 
based on the monthly time series of the difference between the returns of IPO firms with international business activity and without international business activity. We report t-
statistics in parentheses below portfolio alphas that are computed using robust standard errors. Panel C reports average buy-and-hold returns (in decimal) for IPO firms grouped 
using propensity score analysis. We use the propensity score models reported in Table 8 to estimate the likelihood that a firm going public will be engaged in international business 
activity. We then use the nearest-neighbor (NN) matching technique to match each IPO firm with international business activity to a firm(s) with an equal likelihood of 
international business activity but having no international business activity. We report in Panel C the average buy-and-hold returns (BHR) of treatment (international business 
activity) and control (no international business activity) firms for the 24 month (BHR24), 36 month (BHR36), 48 month (BHR48), and 60 month (BHR60) periods starting the first 
month after the initial public offering month. Panel C reports results based on a one-to-three propensity score NN matching scheme with replacement. The z-statistics for the 
difference in mean buy-and-hold returns for treatment and control firms are computed using the analytical estimator of the asymptotic variance of matching estimators proposed by 
Abadie and Imbens (2006, 2008). We use ***, **, and * to denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
 
 3-year window 5-year window 
 ───────────────────────────────────────── ───────────────────────────────────────── 
Type of international IPOs with international IPOs without Return IPOs with international IPOs without Return 
business activity business activity international activity difference business activity international activity difference 
 
Panel A. Portfolio alphas in percent per month for equally weighted portfolios of IPOs with and without international business activity 
 
Exporter 0.427 0.333** 0.737*** 0.409* 0.259* 0.668*** 
 (1.36) (2.14) (2.59) (1.66) (1.81) (3.18) 
 
Foreign sales 0.345 0.333** 0.671*** 0.418** 0.259* 0.646*** 
 (1.62) (2.14) (3.31) (2.08) (1.81) (3.56) 
 
Exporter and/or foreign sales 0.285 0.333** 0.618*** 0.337** 0.259* 0.597*** 
 (1.57) (2.14) (3.91) (2.02) (1.81) (4.43) 
 
Exporter and foreign sales 0.500 0.333** 0.887 0.877* 0.259* 1.090*** 
 (0.86) (2.14) (1.53) (2.13) (1.81) (2.85) 
 
Panel B. Portfolio alphas in percent per month for value-weighted portfolios of IPOs with and without international business activity 
 
Exporter 0.617 2.56 0.830** 0.590* 0.302** 0.892*** 
 (1.64) (1.61) (2.26) (1.75) (2.23) (2.74) 
 
Foreign sales 0.234 0.256 0.537** 0.200 0.302** 0.534** 
 (1.03) (1.61) (2.27) (0.91) (2.23) (2.41) 
 
Exporter and/or foreign sales 0.286 0.256 0.542*** 0.306 0.302** 0.607*** 
 (1.50) (1.61) (2.74) (1.58) (2.23) (3.22) 
 
Exporter and foreign sales 0.737 0.256 1.010 0.915* 0.302** 1.250*** 
 (1.16) (1.61) (1.63) (1.91) (2.23) (2.66) 
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Table 9 – continued 
 
Panel C. Comparison of average buy-and-hold returns over 24 months (BHR24), 36 months (BHR36), 48 months 
(BHR48), and 60 months (BHR60) after the IPO for propensity-scored-matched samples with international business 
activity (treatment group) and without international business activity (control group) 
 
Type of international Treatment Control 
business activity group group Difference z-Statistic 
 
Exporter 
 
BHR24 0.374 0.078 0.296 3.64
***
 
 
BHR36 0.440 0.261 0.179 1.56 
 
BHR48 0.716 0.332 0.384 1.97
**
 
 
BHR60 0.996 0.550 0.446 1.56 
 
Foreign sales 
 
BHR24 0.328 0.215 0.113 1.40 
 
BHR36 0.456 0.361 0.095 0.74 
 
BHR48 0.706 0.405 0.301 2.05
**
 
 
BHR60 0.886 0.565 0.321 1.60 
 
Exporter and/or foreign sales 
 
BHR24 0.339 0.148 0.191 2.84
***
 
 
BHR36 0.448 0.302 0.146 1.48 
 
BHR48 0.686 0.360 0.326 2.30
**
 
 
BHR60 0.953 0.551 0.402 1.79
*
 
 
Exporter and foreign sales 
 
BHR24 0.493 0.172 0.321 2.03
**
 
 
BHR36 0.435 0.388 0.047 0.21 
 
BHR48 0.932 0.479 0.453 1.27 
 
BHR60 0.960 0.556 0.404 1.16 
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Table 10 
 
Robustness tests of long-run performance of IPO firms with and without international business activity 
 
Calendar time abnormal returns (in percent) are reported for IPOs with and without international business activity over the period from 1981 to 2012. For each calendar month, we 
calculate the return on equally weighted portfolios of firms with and without international business activity. In Panel A, we use the monthly time series of portfolio returns to 
estimate portfolio alphas using a purged eight-factor model. The eight factors include the three Fama-French (1993) factors, the Carhart (1997) momentum factor, the Cooper et al. 
(2008) asset growth factor, the Harvey and Siddique (2000) co-skewness factor, the Lyandres et al. (2008) investment factor, and the Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) liquidity factor. 
Following Loughran and Ritter (2000), we construct the factors after purging firms that have publicly issued equity in an IPO or SEO during the prior five years. In Panel B, IPO 
firms are grouped by net sales in millions of 2009 constant dollars measured at the fiscal year end immediately after the IPO. Of the 4,994 IPO firms in the sample, 2,057 are 
classified as small (sales < $50 million) and 2,937 are classified as large (sales ≥ $50 million). Of the 2,057 small IPO firms, 462 (23%) have international business activity (399 
with exports, 91 with foreign sales, and 28 with exports and foreign sales); and of the 2,937 large IPO firms, 922 (31%) have international business activity (494 with exports, 557 
with foreign sales, and 129 with exports and foreign sales). In this panel, IPOs with international business activity are IPO firms with exports and/or foreign sales in the IPO year 
and the year before. We use an up-purged eight-factor model to compute calendar time abnormal returns. In Panel C, IPO firms are grouped by whether they are an acquirer in an 
acquisition within one year after the IPO issue date. In this panel, IPOs with international business activity are IPO firms with exports and/or foreign sales in the IPO year and the 
year before. We use an up-purged eight-factor model to compute calendar time abnormal returns. For 3 and 5 year rolling time periods, the first two columns in each panel report 
portfolio alphas (monthly excess return in percent) for IPOs with international business activity and without international business activity, respectively. The third column for each 
3 and 5 year rolling time period reports a portfolio alpha based on the monthly time series of the difference between the returns of IPO firms with international business activity 
and without international business activity. We report t-statistics in parentheses below portfolio alphas that are computed using robust standard errors. We use ***, **, and * to 
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
 
 3-year window 5-year window 
 ───────────────────────────────────────── ───────────────────────────────────────── 
  IPOs with international IPOs without Return IPOs with international IPOs without Return 
 IPO firm sales business activity international activity difference business activity international activity difference 
 
Panel A. Portfolio alphas in percent per month using a purged eight-factor model 
 
Exporter 0.650
**
 0.082 0.715** 0.546** 0.103 0.649*** 
 (1.97) (0.53) (2.39) (2.16) (0.74) (2.88) 
 
Foreign sales 0.397 0.082 0.540** 0.377 0.103 0.532** 
 (1.60) (0.53) (2.31) (1.60) (0.74) (2.50) 
 
Exporter and/or foreign sales 0.388
**
 0.082 0.470*** 0.364** 0.103 0.467*** 
 (2.04) (0.53) (2.84) (2.13) (0.74) (3.27) 
 
Exporter and foreign sales 0.203 0.082 0.428 0.788* 0.103 0.916** 
 (0.32) (0.53) (0.69) (1.75) (0.74) (2.17) 
 
Panel B. Portfolio alphas in percent per month grouping IPOs by firm sales 
 
Sales < $50 million 0.350 0.651*** 0.978** 0.510 0.336 0.820** 
 (0.89) (2.68) (2.50) (1.54) (1.56) (2.54) 
 
Sales ≥ $50 million 0.327* 0.078 0.404** 0.327* 0.151 0.478*** 
 (1.81) (0.54) (2.46) (1.95) (1.13) (3.22) 
 
Panel C. Portfolio alphas in percent per month grouping IPOs by acquisition activity within one year of IPO issue date 
 
Acquirer 0.185 0.213 0.525* 0.328 0.156 0.596** 
 (0.48) (0.70) (1.80) (1.19) (0.77) (2.11) 
 
Non-acquirer 0.302 0.355** 0.656*** 0.313* 0.225 0.538*** 
 (1.48) (1.99) (3.16) (1.86) (1.54) (3.59) 
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Table 11 
 
The effect of international business activity on the survival of newly public firms 
 
This table reports estimates from a Cox proportional hazard model of the likelihood of IPO failure from the date of 
the IPO to failure or December 31, 2012. Failed IPOs are defined as firms that have been delisted because of 
bankruptcy or liquidation. The time-to-failure is the number of months between the IPO month and the month of 
delisting. The dependent variable is the logged hazard rate. The key independent variables in Models (1)-(4) are the 
dummy variables Exporter, Foreign sales, Exporter and/or foreign sales, and Exporter and foreign sales, 
respectively. In Model (1) the regression sample excludes IPOs with foreign sales that do not also have exports, in 
Model (2) the regression sample excludes IPOs with exports that do not also have foreign sales, and in Model (4) the 
regression sample excludes IPOs with exports or foreign sales. The other independent variables in the models are 
defined in the Appendix. All models include year and Fama-French 48-industry fixed effects. In parentheses below 
the coefficient estimates are z-statistics computed using robust standard errors clustered by industry. Hazard ratios 
for international business activity variables are reported in square brackets below coefficient estimates. We use ***, 
**, and * to denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
 
 Exporter 0.344*** 
  (3.49) 
  [0.709] 
 
 Foreign sales  0.397*** 
   (2.78) 
   [0.672] 
 
 Exporter and/or foreign sales   0.330*** 
    (3.58) 
    [0.719] 
 
 Exporter and foreign sales    0.571*** 
     (2.64) 
     [0.565] 
 
 Log proceeds 0.186* 0.272*** 0.217** 0.241*** 
  (1.88) (3.09) (2.23) (2.78) 
 
 Venture capital 0.052 0.012 0.038 0.029 
  (0.75) (0.16) (0.48) (0.39) 
 
 Prestigious Underwriter 0.088 0.140 0.106 0.121 
  (0.89) (1.32) (1.24) (1.16) 
 
 Offer price revision )10(
2  0.523*** 0.477** 0.546** 0.454** 
  (2.81) (2.28) (2.14) (2.00) 
 
 Log(1 + firm age) 0.306*** 0.288*** 0.295*** 0.297*** 
  (6.48) (5.26) (7.26) (5.42) 
 
 Underpricing )10(
2  0.137* 0.112 0.148 0.099 
  (1.82) (1.34) (1.05) (1.31) 
 
 Log issuer mkt cap 0.187* 0.109 0.141* 0.159* 
  (1.94) (1.20) (1.68) (1.78) 
 
 Market-to-book 0.051*** 0.047*** 0.055*** 0.043*** 
  (3.21) (2.66) (3.04) (2.60) 
 
 Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
 Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
 Model Chi-square 467.1
***
 419.66
***
 493.23
***
 390.95
***
 
 
 Observations 4,471 4,224 4,956 3,739 
 
